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«We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape till custom make it
Their perch, and not their terror.»
Shakespeare,
Act Two, Scene 1
Measure for Measure
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
As part of the triennial programme of research of the International
Collective in Support of Fishworkers, I was assigned a study on the role of
legislation in mitigating or resolving inshore conflicts among fishermen in
Asian countries which have adopted a zoning system. The main foci of the
study, according to the letter of assignment, are
— to examine the history of fishing regulations and the genesis of conflicts
over fishing space and resources.
— to study the effectiveness of fishing regulations in resolving these conflicts.
— to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of administering fishing regulations to
protect the interests of the small-scale fishermen and,
— to assess the extent of awareness of fishing legislation among the
artisanal fishermen.
In consultation with Dr. Francis T. Christy Jr. (formerly Senior Fishery
Planning Officer, Fishery Development Planning Service, Fishery Policy and
Planning Division, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome) and Mr. Rolf
Willmann, (Fishery Planning Analyst, Fishery Policy and Planning Division,
FAO, Rome), five countries in the Asian region were chosen for the study.
These were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Japan.
Both Indonesia and Malaysia witnessed violent conflicts in the inshore
waters between trawlers and traditional gear groups leading to destruction of
fishing unit and loss of life in the 1970’s. As result of these conflicts, which also
had other ramifications, Indonesia and Malaysia introduced a zoning
arrangement to safeguard the interests of small fishermen. In addition,
Indonesia also banned trawling in the waters west of 120 degrees E Iongitude.
In the Philippines, although there were no violent conflicts between
trawlers and traditional gear groups, there has always been discernible
tension between the two. A series of legislative measures were drawn up.
Principal among them was the legislation reserving the coastal waters for
non-trawl/non purse-seine gear groups. Moreover, in the Philippines the
rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine resources
are guaranteed by the Constitution.
Thailand has one of the earliest set of laws to conserve its fishery
resources. However, inter-gear conflicts have not taken place on a
significant scale although the desertification of the Gulf of Thailand is an
ongoing process ever since otter-board trawling was introduced in 1961.
Japan has an efficient system for the management of coastal waters
which has its origin in its feudal period from 1603 to 1867 A.D. Almost all
intra-sectoral conflicts are resolved within its unique co-operative structure
and only inter-sectoral conflicts are referred to the judiciary. In spite of the
system’s efficiency and viability, Japan has not been able to overcome two
problems common to almost all the commercial fisheries of the world, viz.,
over capitalisation of the fishery and overfishing of resources.
With these illustrations, methods of conflict management will be
discussed in the following chapters. In addition to the examination of
origin/nature of conflicts, the role of legislation and the status of enforcement,
the study will also discuss the economic, political and social specificities in
these countries that constitute the texture of the conflict and its mitigation.
The study is based on an extensive visit to all these countries.
Discussions were held with fishermen, marine biologists, economists,
anthropologists, administrators, politicians, lawyers and social activists.
The visit occurred between the first week of November 1988 and the middle
of February 1989. The attempt was to talk to as wide a spectrum of people
as possible. In addition, secondary material in the form of legislation,
research papers, newspaper clippings and other relevant publications were
collected from the respective countries.
The following libraries were consulted for the study:
— University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway;
— FAO Fisheries Division, Rome, Italy;
10
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— Institute for Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan;
— National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan;
— International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management
(ICLARM), Manila, the Philippines;
— Director General of Fisheries, Jakarta, Indonesia:
— Research Institute for Marine Fisheries, Jakarta, Indonesia;
— Fishing Technique Development Centre, Semarang, Indonesia;
— Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand;
— Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC), Bangkok,
Thailand;
— Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM), Penang, Malaysia; and
— INFOFISH Library, Kuala Lumpur.
The nature of conflicts and their magnitude are different in different
countries. They depend very much on historical situations and the prevailing
conditions. The focus of this study hence has to adjust to these changes.
In Indonesia, we will consider in detail the «success» of the trawling ban
in terms of its objectives. The motives behind the ban will also be discussed.
Various adjustments made in the zoning system and their role in the
amelioration of conflicts between trawlers and inshore gill-net fishermen will
be the focus in Malaysia.
The diffused nature of perception, poor awareness of legislation and
total lack of implementation of various provisions will be discussed in the
context of the Philippines.
The tradition of legislation, particularly for ensuring conservation of
aquatic resources and its poor implementation, will be the focus of Thailand
since there is very little evidence of conflicts between small fishermen and
other fishery operators.
And finally, in the case of Japan, we will discuss the evolution of
fishermen’s co-operatives and the viability of a system, which resolves
conflicts within its framework, without resorting to the State machinery.
Limitation of language was a problem in gaining access to all the
relevant material for the study and visiting all the fishing villages one would
have liked to. Constraint on time was another limitation. The cost-aspects
of enforcement also could not be obtained either because of confidentiality
or lack of availability. Thailand was the only exception.
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Indonesia is an archipelago of over13,000 islands located strategically
between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. Total fish production in
1986 amounted to 2.5 million tones
valued at US$ 1700 million with the
marine sector accounting for 75
percent of production and 60 percent
of gross value. The fisheries sector
accounted for 4 percent of the total
Indonesian agricultural production
by value and contributed to one per
cent of the GDP in 1986. Fisheries
exports accounted for only 1.3
percent of total Indonesian exports in
1985 and 4.3 percent of non-
petroleum exports. In quantity terms,
this is only about 3 percent of the
total production. Thus the fisheries
production is primarily oriented
towards the domestic market.
According to an ADB Study the per
capita consumption of fish is about
41 kg (as against the official figure of
14 kg.)
There are over 3 million fishermen
in Indonesia, 43 percent of whom are
in the marine sector; another 43 per-
cent in aquaculture and the remain-
ing 14 percent in inland capture
fisheries. The marine fishermen com-
prise equally of full-time and part-time
fishermen and of the 700,000 full-time
fishermen, over 50 percent are in the
Malacca Straits and the Java sea.
These areas account for about 50
percent of the total production.
There is no coherent definition
of different sub-sectors but there is a
nominal one according to which all
gear operated without the use of a
craft and all boats powered by sail or
outboard motors constitute the small-
scale sector. All boats with inboard
engines belong to either the medium-
scale or large-scale sectors. Although
there is no clear distinction between
the two, the quantum of investment
is used to distinguish between the two
I N D O N E S I A
sub-sectors. According to Bailey et al
(1987) the large, medium and small-
scale sub-sectors contributed to
roughly 2 percent, 43 percent and 55
percent respectively of the total catch
in 1982.
Artisanal fishermen operated
219,000 non-powered craft in 1986,
about half of which were dug-out
canoes. This is about 70 percent of
the total number of craft in Indonesia.
These craft operate a wide variety of
gear including gill-nets, cast-nets,
trapsseines and hook-and-line.
Artisanal fishing has a low produc-
tivity (about 1400 kilograms/fisher-
man/year) and  takes  place in a
narrow band around the coast. More
than 60 percent of the fishermen live
below the national poverty threshold.
The number of powered vessels
has increased rapidly in recent years
from 32,000 in 1979 to 99,000 in
1986. About 65 percent are powered
by outboard motors.  Of those with
inboard engines 80 percent are less
than 5 GT (gross tonnage). The in-
crease in both forms of motorization
is particularly significant after the
trawling ban of 1980.
The medium and large-scale
operations comprise purse-seiners,
pole and line vessels and trawlers.
Prior to the imposition of the ban on
trawling, 3,000 trawlers located main-
ly in the Malacca Straits, northern
Java and Kalimantan took about 57
percent of the total demersal catch
i.e., 10 percent of the total catch of all
marine fish. After the ban their catch
has come down to 0.5 percent  of the
total. This is because trawling is still
permitted in the waters east of 120
degrees E longitude i.e., in the
Arafura Sea.
The catch of purse-seiners has
increased from 10 percent of total
marine catch in 1979 to 15 percent
in 1986. These vessels operate main-
ly in the Malacca Straits and the Java
sea in areas quite distant from the
shore.
Purse-seining and trawl fishing
were introduced around the same
time in Indonesia. In the late-1960s,
purse-seine was introduced under
the auspices of the government in
the northern coast of Java. Trawling
developed fully on private initiative
unlike in countries like the Philippines
and Thailand. It was introduced by
the ethnic Chinese in an area called
Bagansiapi-api in Malacca Straits,
from the western coast of Malaysia in
1966 (Yamamoto, 1977).
The development of purse-seine
fishery did not lead to any significant
conflict with the small fishermen
primarily because the area of opera-
tion is away from the shore. Trawlers,
14
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on the other hand, confined their
operations to the inshore waters. The
development of the trawl fishery,
therefore, led to serious conflicts bet-
ween trawlers and gill-net fishermen
in Malacca Straits and northern
Java. More than a competition for
resources, this is believed to be a
result of destruction of craft and gear
by trawlers harvesting prawns within
12 miles from the shore, the usual
fishing ground of small fishermen.
Background of the
trawl ban
Before we begin our discussion
on the impact of trawling and the im-
plications of the trawl ban in In-
donesia, certain points have to be
kept in mind. Firstly, more than 80
percent of the otter trawlers in In-
donesia were confined to Java and
Sumatra, particularly to the Malacca
Straits and northern Java. Secondly,
Malacca Straits and Java have the
largest concentration of fishermen’s
population. Together they account for
over 50 percent of the total full-time
fishermen. Thirdly, more than 50 per-
cent of the total marine production
and 60 percent of exportable prawns
come from these areas. Fourthly,
most of the trawler/purse-seine
owners and traders in Indonesia are
of Chinese origin.
The ethnic factor plays a very im-
portant role in the economy of In-
donesia. This is so in the fishing
sector as well. This is very important
for understanding the conflict bet-
ween the trawlers and small
fishermen and this has been com-
pletely overlooked in all the major
studies on the trawl-ban (Chong, Kee-
Chai et al 1987; Bailey et al 1987;
Naamin 1984; Darmoredjo. S 1983)
perhaps because of the highly sen-
sitive nature of ethnic politics in In-
donesia (See May. B. 1978.
The sea around Kalimantan is
also an important prawn fishing
ground but interestingly this area did
not witness any conflicts between
trawlers and small-scale fishermen,
perhaps because the operators in the
small-scale as well as large-scale sec-
tors are both predominantly Chinese.
Unlike in Malaysia where the con-
flicts between trawlers and gill-net
fishermen erupted in the same year
that trawling was commercially in-
troduced, in Indonesia it was only by
the mind-1970’s- a decade after their
introduction-that these tensions
started surfacing in the form of
clashes in the sea. The early conflicts
in Malaysia are documented but in In-
donesia there is hardly any such
documentation. They broke out for
SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1
the first time in the Malacca Straits
and were presumably a spill-over of
Malaysian conflicts. The common
nature of the «problem» in the Malac-
ca Straits combined with similar 
ethnic characteristics — with almost 
all the trawler owners being Chinese
and traditional fishermen being
predomi-nantly Malay or Indonesian 
— gave the conflicts a similar form in
both the countries. From the Malac-
ca Straits the conflicts spread to nor-
thern Java.
As mentioned earlier, Malacca
Straits and northern Java, where
there were conflicts, are the areas
with the largest concentration of
fishermen and the largest production.
The conflicts arose mainly because 
of competition for space, leading to
destruction of craft and gear, par-
ticularly of gill-net fishermen operating
in the narrow confines of the coastal
waters. Since the commercially
valuable species are largely confined
to the inshore waters, trawlers
operated very close to the coast. Ac-
cording to Dr. Naamin of Fisheries
Research Institute, Jakarta, these
trawlers — called «Cung-King» (1) —
were mostly operating in the 5-40
meters depth zone (Naamin, N. 1984)
and sometimes in depths as shallow
as 2 meters.
Though the overall production of
the traditional sector did not suffer as
a result of trawling, the aggregate an-
nual output of the gill-net fishermen
did decline. Their production in both
the Malacca Straits and northern Java
dropped to 80,000 tonnes in 1980
from 120,000 tonnes in 1976. This
subsequently doubled — presumably
as a result of the trawling ban—to
160,000 tonnes in 1986. Thus the
unequal competition for space not on-
ly led to destruction of craft and gear
but also affected the harvest of the
traditional gill-net fishermen.
The various measures aimed at
managing the fisheries sector par-
ticularly trawl fishing, should be seen
in this backdrop.
History of fishing legislation
Before the advent of conflicts bet-
ween trawlers and gill-net fishermen,
the fishing legislation in Indonesia
was primarily colonial in origin. The
main focus of the early legislation of
1927 and 1939 — which reserved all
marine fisheries to local citizens and
prohibited foreigners from fishing
16
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(1)Interestingly, Cung-King is also the name of a port in S W China, in Szechwan province at the
confluence of the Yangtze and Chialing rivers. It is a major trade centre for W China and was the
wartime capital of China between 1938 and 1945.
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operations without special permission
— was on security ( Bailey et al ibid.).
The fisheries law was basically a ploy
by the Dutch to check encroachments
of other colonial interests into Indone-
sian archipelago. The first efforts at
the formulation of new fisheries
legislation were attempted after the
eruption of inter-gear conflicts in the
mid-1970s. The new measures had
the twin objectives of conservation of
resources and elimination of conflicts.
The first significant measure was
taken by the government in 1975
when Decree 1 was issued. This
limited fishing effort through regula-
tion of the fishing season, of the type,
size and number of boats in a par-
ticular area and of the mesh size
(Bailey et al ibid.). An area-specific
quota system was also established by
the Decree. Subsequently in 1976,
Ministerial Decree 607 was issued
with the specific purpose of controll-
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Zone Distance from shore Closed to
I. 0-3 nautical miles 1. Boats with inboard engines displacing over 5 GT;
2. Boats with inboard engines over 10 HP;
3. All types of trawl gear;
4. All purse-seines;
5. Encircling gillnets and drifting gillnets for tuna;
6. Seines not longer than 120 meters.
II. 3-7 nautical miles 1. Boats with inboard engines displacing over 25 GT;
2. Boats with inboard engines over 50 HP;
3. Otter trawls with head ropes longer than 12 M;
4. Midwater trawls and pair trawls;
5. Purse-seines longer than 300 M 
III. 7-12 nautical miles 1. Boats with inboard engines displacing over 100 GT;
2. Boats with inboard engines over 200 HP;
3. Demersal and midwater trawls using otter boards
equipped with head ropes over 20 m in length;
4. Pair trawls;
5. Purse-Seines longer than 600 m;
IV. Over 12 nautical miles 1. Pair trawl, except in the Indian Ocean where they 
are permitted.
Table I
Zones of Operation for Fishing Boats Established by the Minister
of Agriculture’s Decree 607 in 1976.
Source: Bailey, C et al 1987. Indonesian Marine Capture Fisheries
ing trawling operations. According to
this Decree, which is still in force, the
sea was divided into four zones with
the main purpose of preventing
physical conflict and social friction
between the traditional and trawling
sectors (Naamin, N. op. cit.). This
zoning is, however, not applicable in
fishing grounds in the Arafura sea
and adjacent waters where, alleged-
ly, there are no traditional fishermen
(Darmoredjo, S. op. cit.)(1).
The table I gives details of the
zoning arrangement.
Soon after the issuance of Decree
607 Decree 609 was brought out
restricting the operation of trawlers to
the area for which they were licen-
sed. Attempts were made to imple-
ment both these Decrees. However,
effective enforcement was impossi-
ble, particularly in Malacca Straits
because of inherent difficulties. Many
illegal trawlers were already in opera-
tion and in the absence of a strong
enforcement machinery the efforts to
limit the number of trawlers resulted
in thousands of trawlers beginning to
operate without licences.
This further aggravated in inter-
gear conflicts and by 1980 in situa-
tion became so bad that «not only
were the resources impaired and
fishing boats and gear sunk of burn-
ed and houses burned, but human
lives were lost» (Chong, Kee-Chai op.
cit). The President Soeharto for the
first time stepped in and banned trawl
fishing by virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D) 39/1980.
The ban initially covered waters
off Java and Bali (1 Oct 1980) and
three months later waters in the
Malacca Straits off Sumatra were
brought under the ban. But when
trawlers started moving out of their
existing base of operation to other
regions, the ban was extended to the
waters off Kalimantan and West
Sulawesi as well from 1 July 1981. As
it is now, trawling operations are com-
pletely banned to the west of 120
degrees E longitude. Trawling is
allowed in waters to the east of 120
degrees E longitude, provided the
vessels are equipped with a by-catch
excluder device (BED). These are the
waters monopolised by the Japanese
fishing interests (2).
Objectives of the trawl ban
According to Chong, Kee Chai et
18
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(1) But, according to Fisheries Statistics of Indonesia for the year 1980, 20 percent of the total
population of active fishermen are in sulawesi and Irian Jaya.
(2) «Indonesia’s fleet of large fishing vessels was heavily concentrated in Maluku and Irian Jaya in
1980; 121 of the 161 fishing vessels over 50 gt were based in these provinces and virtually all of these
were refrigerated shrimp trawlers of the Japanese joint venture companies«». (ADB, IBRD. 1983).
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al (ibid.) the ban on trawling «is the
most bold or courageous and in-
novative fisheries management step
which the country has so far under-
taken» and it «represents an impor-
tant reaffirmation of small-scale
fisheries development as a national
priority» (Bailey et al ibid.). According
to the then Director General of
Fisheries, Sardjono, P.D.39 was
clearly a «political decision» intend-
ed at protecting the interests of the
traditional fishermen and the
«philosophical and moral rationale»
for the P.D., according to Bailey et al,
are the priorities mentioned in the
Five Year Plan of Indonesia which
primarily aim at «the distribution of
development benefits among the
widest possible number of Indone-
sians» (Bailey et al ibid). The same
authors also hold that the ban is « the
most recent in a series of manage-
ment policy measures designed to
protect coastal fisheries resources»
though overfishing due to trawling is
established only in Malacca Straits
and northern Java (personal discus-
sion with Purwito Martosubroto,
Director of Fisheries Management, In-
donesia)
Thus the ban apparently has
three objectives:
1) to facilitate better resource
management;
2) to ensure the development of the
traditional sector; and
3) to prevent open conflicts.
Along with the declaration of the
ban on trawling, P.D.No.39 also
created the biggest credit programme
for fisheries in Indonesia under the
Government Agricultural Credit
Scheme (BIMAS), a credit pro-
gramme established in 1965 primarily
for the agricultural sector. The pro-
gramme aimed mainly at assisting
fishermen affected by the prohibition
on trawling. It was to enable them to
convert to another type of fishing or
to brackish-water fish culture.
Out of the total allocation of RP
238 billion (US$ 245 million), 20 per-
cent was for the conversion of 2,300
trawlers into other gear, 9 percent
was for the promotion of non-trawl
fishing methods and 71 percent was
for (a) the intensification of shrimp
culture on 100,000 ha in existing
ponds, (b) creation of 30,000 ha of
new ponds and (c) for construction of
shrimp hatcheries. Under this pro-
gramme the maximum amount ob-
tainable was RP 5 million. The loan
period was five years with a one year
grace period and credit could be us-
ed for both working capital and invest-
ment. No collateral was required
(ADB, IBRD. 1983).
In other words, the main focus of
the credit programme was the inten-
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sification of aquaculture to offset the
potential loss of prawn production as
a result of the ban. The credit pro-
gramme’s objective was certainly not
enhancement of the productive
potential of the traditional sector so
that it could exploit the prawn
resources that were now free from
competition from an incompatible
gear.
Under the scheme only trawlers
built within five years of P.D.39 and
in good condition would qualify for
conversion. Owners of eligible boats
were given the option of selling their
boats to the government, which would
then be converted for use with other
gear and sold to crewmen under the
BIMAS programme (Bailey et al op.
cit.). Though the total credit covered
both investment and working capital
requirements, the investment compo-
nent was specifically for modification
of the hull (under ALTERNATIF I & II);
modification of hull and fishing gear
(ALTERNATIF III) and purchase of ex-
trawl vessels, modification of hull and
fishing gear (under ALTERNATIF IV).
The amount disbursed under ALTER-
NATIF IV was through the co-
operatives (KUD) and the entire
amount disbursed under ALTER-
NATIF I, II & III was given directly to
the applicant (from discussion with
Bank Rayat Indonesia).
Trawl ban: an analysis
Too much panegyric has been
poured on the Indonesian govern-
ment for its «bold» and «innovative»
fisheries management strategy in
banning trawling. This measure has
been hailed all over the world and
the whole world is closely watching
the strides Indonesia is making in its
implementation.
The ban is definitely innovative
because this is perhaps the only
country in the world where a total ban
has been resorted to for defusing
tension and developing traditional
fisheries. But the important question
is whether a unilateral ban can
necessarily lead to the desired
fulfillment of objectives like proper
resource management and develop-
ment of traditional sector.
In other words, how is it to at-
tribute all the «evils» affecting tradi-
tional fishermen to the trawling
sector? Is it not an over simplification
of an otherwise complex set of causal
factors responsible for the indigence
of a large number of fishermen in
Indonesia? In the following section
we will discuss in detail the
implications of the ban and its effect in
achieving the stated objectives. We
will also try to examine the real
motives for its implementation.
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Two facts should be borne in
mind: only 3 percent of the total
expenditure of the Director General of
Fisheries (DGF) is targeted for
fisheries resource management and
environmental protection (out of US $
490 million) during REPELITA IV (the
fourth five year development plan
1984-89) (Bailey et al ibid.); secondly
in the Indonesian Navy — the regula-
tory enforcement authority — «has
duties extending far beyond regula-
tion of fisheries» and «has neither the
resources nor the incen-tive to
become involved in regula-tions of
national fisheries» (Min of Agri., DGF
& ADB, 1988). Consequently, it is a
matter of great convenience that a
total ban was effected. This effectively
makes it easier for implementation
and according to a top official of the
Department of Fisheries, the
fishermen themselves will ensure the
enforcement of the ban.
According to Naamin (ibid.)
over 3,500 vessels were affected by
the trawl ban. About 44,000 workers
lost their jobs (this includes trawler
crew, employees of cold storages,
ice plants, fuel/food suppliers, etc.).
The figure, 3,500 probably includes
in illegal trawlers because according
to the DGF’s Fisheries Statistics of
Indonesia for 1980, there were only
3,100 trawlers in 1980 which
includes the trawlers operating from
the Arafura sea also. The total
number of trawlers operating in the
area affected by the ban was only
about 2,500.
Impact on owners
How did the ban effectively affect
the owners of trawlers? According to
Chong, Kee-Chai et al (op.cit.), at an
annual depreciation of US$ 6,200, the
salvage value of the trawlers was
almost zero since many of them were
over twenty years old. The owners
had already recovered their capital in-
vestments. This is perhaps why very
few trawling units benefited from the
credit programme under BIMAS. Ac-
cording to the above authors, out of
the 600 trawlers operating from the
northern coast of Java more than 50
percent were either tied up at their
operation bases or their fate was
unknown. Naamin (1982) reported
that of the 1,040 trawlers, which were
operated from the major fishing ports
of Java & Sumatra, 45 percent were
inactive in the middle of 1981.
According to the Department of
Fisheries, Indonesia, US$48 million
was earmarked for the conversion of
2,300 trawlers into purse-seiners, gill-
netters, tuna long liners, etc. But acc-
ording to the Bank Rayat Indonesia
(BRI), the principal credit agency of
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the government, only 15 per cent of
the total amount was distributed for
rehabilitation of ex-trawlers. Only one
instalment was released and the pro-
gramme was dropped in 1980 itself
because of the fear of poor repay-
ment (from per-sonal dis-cussion with
the Bank authorities).
This credit programme was meant
to cover both the owner and the crew
of trawlers. About 480 units benefited
from it. Of these, 44 percent were
from the Malacca Straits, 22 percent
from Kalimantan and the rest were
from Java. Only about 20 percent of
the total number of intended
beneficiaries benefited from this
scheme. The joint ownership of ex-
trawlers combined with the nature of
credit distribution seem to have bad-
ly undermined the intended benefits
of this programme. There are success
stories, but according to FAO exten-
sion workers in Semarang, these are
the ones operating on kin-ship lines.
In most cases, however, the pro-
gramme failed miserably. As on 1st
August 1988 51 percent of the loans
advanced remained outstanding.
In addition to ineffective manage-
ment, there were other problems. In
many cases, inappropriate gear was
supplied (Bailey et al op. cit.). This
problem arose because the distribu-
tion of the credit was not in the form 
of direct payment to the applicants.
The Bank, according to the recom-
mendation of the local authority from
the fisheries depart-ment, would
release the credit to the supplier of
gear and engine. As a result, the joint
owners did not have the freedom to
choose the gear they wanted. And of
course, there were problems of cor-
ruption with collusion between the
trader and the local fishery authority.
Secondly, the cost of the fishing
gear and engine provided under the
BIMAS loan programme was higher
than the prevailing market price,
sometimes by as much as 30 percent
(ibid.). The failure of the BIMAS credit
programme was also highlighted by
the leaders of the All Indonesian
Fishermen’s Organisation (HNSI) who
attributed the failure to corruption
among government officials (from
personal discussion).
What happened to trawlers which
decided to convert to other forms of
fishing or non-fishing operations?
There has been no effort on the part
of the Department of Fisheries to
monitor their perform-ance. However,
from our discussions with fisheries
scientists, extension workers etc. it
appears their performance has been
quite mixed.
Some of the trawlers completely
wound up fishing operations and
moved into the movement of goods
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and people between islands. Of those
who shifted to other forms of fishing,
the trawlers from Cilacap (on the
southern coast of Java) moved into
gill-net and trammel-net fishing. There
are 35 GT boats operating trammel-
nets in Cilacap. Almost all the trawlers
from northern Java diversified into
purse-seine fishery. Similarly most of
the converted ones in Sumatra mov-
ed into purse-seining and a few
became tuna-long liners. According
to some of our sources the trawlers
which converted to purse-seines are
doing well in northern Sumatra
(where there are rich pelagic
grounds), whereas those operating
from northern Java are not doing par-
ticularly well because of intense ex-
ploitation in the coastal waters. The
fishing ground there, is now at a
distance of three days cruise (1988).
Many of these converted vessels are
winding up their operations. Those
converted to gill-net operations are
finding the cost of operation exorbi-
tant because of the high costs of
operating a large engine (Bailey et al
op. cit.). Among the ones that are do-
ing well are those operated on kinship
lines.
According to a study quoted by
Bailey et al on Aceh province in
Sumatra, « of the 69 ex-trawlers con-
verted in 1981 through BIMAS loan
totaling RP 1.3 billion, nine of these
boats had since sunk and most of the
rest were not in operation due to
accumulated losses» (ibid.).
One factor, which has been
overlooked by all the studies on the
trawl ban, is the fact that the total
number of otter trawlers in operation
was showing a stagnation from 1978
onwards — even before the ban. But
the number of purse-seiners more
than trebled in the period 1975-1980
(See table II).
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Table ll
Number and Type of Indonesian Fishing Gear 1975-1982
Type of fishing Gear Number of Gear by Year
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Otter trawl 2202 2692 3266 2511 2570 2476 666 453
Purse-seiner 1144 1481 1706 2137 2838 3700 3572 4933
Source: Bailey et al (1987)
This would mean that there was
already a redistribution of fishing ef-
fort from trawling towards purse-
seining even before the ban was
declared. In other words capital had
already started moving out of the
trawling sector, particularly in the in-
tensively fished area like Malacca
Straits and northern Java, into other
forms of fishing where the returns
were much higher. The ban perhaps
speeded up the movement. This sug-
gests that the owners of trawlers were
not all that affected by the ban. If at
all it has affected some, they must be
owners without adequate financial
clout to undertake new investments.
In other words, any management
measure presumably taken for the
benefit of disadvantaged fishermen
does not imply that the privileged
group (of trawler owners in this case)
will have to pay a price. If alternate
channels of investment are open
which ensure an equal if not a higher
return, and if the expected mark-up
is ensured, capital will move. For
most of the owners who are ethnic
Chinese, trawling was only one of
many avenues of investment. They
did not have any difficulty in diversi-
fying into other activities.
Impact on workers 
We have  mentioned earlier that
over 44,000 workers were affected by
the ban, including over 20,000 crew
men. Out of these only about 2,500
benefited from the BIMAS pro-
gramme (about 15 percent). As in the
case of ex-trawl vessels, there has
been no monitoring of the well-being
of these workers after the ban.
Therefore, we had to rely on our in-
formal sources to get an idea about
their situation after the ban.
Among the ex-trawl workers, ap-
parently the ones most affected were
the workers who came from non-
fishing communities. They were
basically peasants from the moun-
tains. After the ban they could not ac-
quire the requisite skills to operate
gill-nets/trawl-nets, purse-seines, etc.
As a result they had to leave the
fishing sector for work in the informal
sector where their earning capacity is
much lower vis-à-vis income from
trawling operations. Though the con-
dition of the workers who joined the
purse-seine sector was better, the
economic returns were lower com-
pared to that in the trawling sector
since the returns to labour had to be
shared among a large number of
workers (the crew size of a trawler
was about a quarter of the crew size
of a purse-seiner). As Chong, Kee-
Chai et al (op. cit.) observe:
«In general, ex-trawl crew fishermen
collectively have not benefited in a
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positive manner from the Ban in
terms of improved and sustained
incomes. For those ex-trawl crew
fishermen who have been able to
hang on to their newly acquired
boats/nets through the credit
programme, their incomes have
reportedly improved somewhat.
However, the number of such
fishermen reporting improved
incomes is limited».
The discussion of the fate of the
ex-trawl workers will not be complete
unless we discuss the allocation and
utilization of credit under BIMAS for
the intensification of shrimp culture.
Though RP 168 billion (US $ 171
million) was to be earmarked for this
purpose according to P.D. 39/80, on-
ly 30 percent was finally allocated.
This scheme was supposed to benefit
ex-trawl workers also but our discus-
sions with BRI and other sources
revealed that there were very few reci-
pients from the ex-trawl workers and
of the 28,000 people who were ad-
vanced loans, most of them were
from non-trawl fishing operations or
from the aquaculture sector. The
scheme was also dropped after the
release of the first instalment because
of poor repayment. Only nine percent
of the RP 53 billion advanced under
the scheme was repaid as on 1 Aug
1988.
Impact on traditional sector
So far we have been discussing
the impact of the ban on trawling on
the owners and the workers. From our
discussion it can be seen that the ex-
trawl crew men are the worst affected
by the ban. The credit programme in-
tended to rehabilitate them does not
seem to have resulted in any
desirable improvement in their level
of income or earning capacity.
As we have mentioned before, the
main objectives on the ban included
the development of the traditional
sector and better resource manage-
ment. Now let us see to what extent
these objectives were achieved.
One of the main problems in
discussing how the benefits of the
ban accrued to the traditional
fishermen arises from the way tradi-
tional and modern sectors are defin-
ed in Indonesia. The definition is 
craft-specific viz. all vessels with or
without outboard motors are viewed
as forming the traditional or small-
scale sector whereas all craft with in-
board engines from the modern sec-
tor. This definition does not help us
get an idea about the benefits accru-
ing to the small-scale sector because
the marine fishery produc-tion figures
are given by type of fishing gear in the
annual statistics published by the
Director General of Fisheries (DGF).
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Gear have a protracted use and both
small-scale and modern sectors use
similar gear. Since we do not have
craft-gear specific production figures,
it is difficult to establish the benefit ac-
cruing to the small fisher-men as a
result of the ban. Gear-wise produc-
tion figures would have been ten-
tatively sufficient if different types of
gear were sub-classified according to
their size. Unfortunately, this is also
not done. At the most, we have only
general indicators like an increase in
the number of trammel-nets, shrimp
gill-nets or increase in the rate of
motorization.
Of course, there are figures to
show the production of prawns but
these figures indicate only the non-
trawl catch. In other words, though
«the trawl ban effectively redistributes
fishing effort away from the trawl
operation to the other fisheries»
(Chong, Kee-Chai et al ibid.) it does
not presuppose «a reallocation of the
resources... in favour of small-scale
fishermen» as contended by the
above authors. There is no data to
understand the distribution of fishing
effort within the non-trawl sector bet-
ween artisanal and commercial
operators. Therefore, increase in pro-
ductive capacity, or production does
not mean that the small-scale sector
is benefiting from the ban. However,
we will examine these to get a general
idea about the impact of the ban on
the non-trawl gear-groups, assuming
that part of the benefit would be ac-
cruing to the subsistence fishermen
too.
Since the total marine fish produc-
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Table III
Total Output by Gill-Net
(in 1000 tonnes)
Area/Year 1976 1980 1986
Aggregate production 223 315 477
1. Malacca Straits 38 34 53
2. Northern Java 80 48 103
Total (1+2) 118 82 156
Total marine production 483 850 923
Source: Annual Fisheries Statistics of Indonesia 1976, 1980, 1986 DGF Jakarta.
Malacca Northern Kilimantan Irian Jaya Total
Straits Java Total & Total for the
Moluccas Country
1 2 1+2 3 4 1–4
Tiger Prawn
1976 5,100 300 5,400 1,100 2,000 8,500 9,300
1980 7,000 400 7,400 1,500 1,200 10,100 11,000
1986 5,100 200 5,300 7,100 1,000 13,400 14,100
Banana Prawn
1976 4,000 5,000 9,000 2,900 3, 000 14,900 19,000
1980 10,000 5,500 15,500 10,400 5, 000 30,900 38,700
1986 4,700 7,600 12,300 8,500 4, 100 24,900 33,000
Endeavour Prawn
1976 6,600 1,700 8,300 1,500 500 10,300 12,600
1980 2,900 2,300 5,200 2,700 2,500 10,400 14,000
1986 4,800 2,600 7,400 4,400 1,200 13,000 16,500
Total
1976 15,700 7,000 22,700 5,500 5,500 33,700 40,900
1980 19,900 8,200 28,100 14,600 8,700 51,400 63,700
1986 14,600 10,400 25,000 20,000 6,300 51,300 63,600
Compiled from Annual Fisheries Statistics (1976, 1980, 1986), DGF Indonesia.
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tion was growing at an annual rate of
5 percent between 1981-86 we are
taking certain specific indicators to
assess the benefit to the non-trawl
sector. These are the (a) total gill-net
production figures (b) the total output
of tiger, banana and endeavour
prawns, and (c) the in-crease in pro-
ductivity. In our analysis we are in-
cluding only Malacca Straits, northern
Java — the areas where there were
rampant conflicts between trawlers
and gill-netters.
Though the total marine produc-
tion almost doubled from 483,000 ton-
nes to 850,000 between 1976 and
1980 there seems to have been a
decline in the aggregate production
of all gill-net units in the Malacca
Straits and northern Java.
The figures for Malacca Straits
and northern Java are particularly
significant because, while during the
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Table IV
Marine production of Prawns (In Tonnes)
period 1976-1980 total gill-net produc-
tion for the whole country had in-
creased by 30 percent the total
production in Malacca Straits and
northern Java actually declined by 30
percent. The recovery after the ban
in these two areas is also significant.
When the aggregate output of gill-
netters increased by 34 percent bet-
ween 1980-1986, in these two areas
it increased by 48 percent. These
figures unequivocally estab-lish the
positive impact of the ban on gill-net
fishermen, thus highlighting the
economic rationale behind the earlier
conflicts.
Since tiger prawn, banana prawn
and endeavour prawn are the com-
mercially most valuable species of
prawns, we have included only their
production (from Malacca Straits and
northern Java) to see the extent to
which the gill-net sector could replace
the productive capacity of the
trawlers.
Indonesia seems to have come
back to the pre-trawl ban levels of pro-
duction by 1986 in the case of com-
mercially most valuable species of
prawns. Three factors are worth notic-
ing in Table IV. Firstly, total produc-
tion has recovered. The production of
prawns in northern Java in 1986 sur-
passed the 1980 level and that in
Malacca Strait was just a little below
the 1980 catch. Secondly, the in-
crease in total production is primari-
ly due to an im-pressive increase in
production from Kalimantan which
registered a more than 30 percent in-
crease in output between 1980 and
1986. This in-crease is perhaps
because of an in-crease in fishing ef-
fort following mig-ration of fishermen
into these areas (See MOA, DGF &
ADB 1988). Thirdly, the total produc-
tion in Molluccas-Irian Jaya seems to
be declining — though the production
in these areas is attributed to trawlers
– giving credence to the fear of over-
fishing in Arafura sea which is the
preserve of joint-venture companies
with Japan.
Considering the fact that all these
prawns are harvested by non-trawl
fishermen, it is quite significant that
gear with low efficiency (just 20 per-
cent of the trawl gear’s productivity)
are able to harvest commercially
valuable species in all the areas
where trawling is banned.
During the period 1980-86 there
was a discernible increase in the
motorization of traditional crafts and
in the population of boats with inboard
motors. The total number of OBMs in-
creased by 130 percent and IBMs
more than doubled. In the latter
category the craft belonging to the
<5 GT category increased by 150
percent between 1980 and 1986 ex-
hibiting the highest rate of growth.
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Most of these vessels (belonging to
both categories) are operating from
Malacca Straits and northern Java,
which as we have mentioned in the
beginning, are the most important
fishing grounds in Indonesia with the
largest concentration of fisher peo-
ple’s population. The total number of
shrimp gill-nets (including trammel-
nets) also doubled between 1980 and
1986 (See table V).
The increase in outboard
motorization, inboard engine-powered
vessels and shrimp gill-nets need not
necessarily be a consequence of the
ban on trawling though the ban must
have provided a definite incentive for
moving in this direction. This is
because, even in the years prior to
the ban these variable were show-
ing an increase in numbers (See
table V).
The higher incidence of motorisa-
tion and the increase in shrimp gill-
nets after the trawl-ban only indicate
the restructuring of fishing effort
resulting in the availability of viable
opportunities for relatively less effi-
cient gear. But this does not presume
that the cake is redistributed in favour
of poorer fishermen. What is perhaps
happening in all likelihood is that the
balance of power within the fishing
sector (in the coastal region) is acquir-
ing a new form with the owners of
motorized boats becoming the domi-
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Table V
Total Number of Inboard &
Outboard Motors and Shrimp Gill-Nets
1976 1980 1986
No. of OBMs 8,000 27,000 63,000
No.of IBMs
<5 GT 5,000 11,000 28,000
<5<30 4,000 7,000 8,000
>30<100 200 300 400
>100 100 100 100
Total 17,300 45,400 99,500
Shrimp Gill-Nets
(including trammel-nets) 17,000 25,000 50,000
Source: Annual Fisheries Statistics, DGF, Indonesia.
nant force and the large number of
unmotorized fishermen (over 70 per-
cent of fishing craft in Indonesia are
still unmotorized) remaining the
deprived class. All the studies done
so far on the trawl ban tend to hide
the differentiation within the non-
trawl/non-purse-seine sector and do
not throw any light on the emergence
of new contradic-tions within this
sector.
Since the ownership of craft and
gear is highly skewed in Indonesia
(from personal discussions), even an
increase in total number of outboard
motors is not a sufficient indicator of
an increase in the welfare of sub-
sistence fishermen. In the light of the
present ownership pattern, a decline
in the total number of dugout boats
(the predominant fishing craft in In-
donesia) does not imply that more
subsistence fishermen are acquiring
outboard engines. Contrarily, it is like-
ly to indicate that more fishermen are
becoming dispossessed of craft and
gear and becoming wage-earners. In
Bakassi fish landing center, Jakarta,
for example, I came across a large
number of trammel-net operators who
are actually employed by absentee
owners from the eastern side of Java.
But the value of labour share has ap-
preciated in the trammel-net sector
because of prawns. However, the ac-
tual picture is not very clear because
the season for prawn in mainly for four
months in a year (Dec - Mar). The
trammel-net fishermen tend to con-
centrate on trammel-net operations
even in off seasons without attemp-
ting a judicious shift to other gear.
There is no idea about the opportunity
cost of fishing effort in the lean
months.
The picture that emerges from
numerous discussions I had with per-
sons working in the field of fisheries
is that the trawling ban has not really
benefited the vast majority of sub-
sistence fishermen though it has
benefited the trammel-net operators.
In other words, we can say that after
the ban trammel-net operators have
come to be relatively better-off com-
pared to other traditional gear
operators. I was told a few success
stories of how some owners have
become very rich after the imposition
of the ban. A few have amassed so
much wealth that they have moved
out of fishing into cultivation of cloves
in the plantation sector, for example.
But the general tendency apparently
is to continue in fisheries by becom-
ing absentee owners of the fishing
units.
What was the fate of the credit
programme under BIMAS for the
traditional shrimp fishing with gear
other than trawls? RP 22 billion was
originally to be provided according to
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the P.D. No.29/80 but only 40 percent
of this was actually spent (in 1982-83).
This programme was also dropped
because of poor repayment. As on 1
Aug 1988 the total repayment
amounted to only 10 percent of the
outstanding loan (BRI sources).
On the whole, as Chong, Kee-
Chai (op.cit.) have observed, in their
tongue-in-cheek paper, «the small-
scale fishermen have only benefited
marginally if at all». Perhaps the peo-
ple who benefited most from the ban
are the local traders who procure
prawns for the domestic and interna-
tional markets. Since the total number
of landing centers increased as a
result of widely dispersed use of
trammel-nets all over western In-
donesia, procure-ment seems to have
become less competitive and more
rewarding for the traders.
Impact on resources
Even if we concede for conve-
nience that the trawl ban has led to
the recovery of resources in the
Malacca Straits and northern Java, is
banning of excessive effort a
necessary and sufficient condition to
ensure their sustainability? As the
MOA, DGF, ADB study (1988)
Observes
«Although the banning of trawlers
west of the 120 degrees E line of
longitude gave a temporary respite to
some fish supplies available to
artisanal fishermen, the relief was
temporary. The continuing environ-
mental abuse of esturial food chain
systems and the use of small mesh
and other unauthorized gear con-
tinue to reduce supplies available».
Moreover, inherent contradictions
in government policies also tend to
undermine the resource-base, par-
ticularly that of prawns. Though the
credit programme initiated under
BIMAS was presumably for the
rehabilitation of the ex-trawlers, as we
mentioned before, the focus was
mainly on aquaculture to promote
prawns production. Even otherwise,
the provincial governments in In-
donesia are blatantly opening up
mangrove forests for converting into
tambaks (brackish culture ponds) to
grow more prawn, particularly black
tiger, which fetches the highest price
in the international market. The rapid
expansion and intensification of
prawn culture has led to increased
harvesting of fry and gravid females
for the culture-farms. Thus, for exam-
ple, the collection of fry in Java in-
creased from a mere 3,000 (in no.) in
1980 to 80,000 in 1986 (Annual
Fisheries Statistics DGF). To quote
from the MOA, DGF, ADB study (ibid.)
which clearly establishes the link bet-
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tween marine production and
aquaculture:
«The rapid development of black tiger
shrimp production has meant an
equally accelerated effort to acquire
gravid females from the wild for hat-
chery spawning and egg supply. A
new set of acquiring and distributing
organizations have developed to
search out and market these females
by the hundreds of thousands.
Although some regions still have a
reasonable volume and are able to
supply other parts of the country some
marine stocks have had their gravid
female population heavily harvested.
The advancement of tambak develop-
ment for black tiger shrimp export has
thus deprived the marine resource of
a critical share of its breeding stock.
Both the removal of the mangrove and
the capture of gravid females will
reduce the natural populations of all
shrimp, and specifically the natural
populations of tiger shrimp».
The consequences of over-
exploitation of gravid females have
not yet started showing up in the
marine production figures of prawns.
However, it is only a matter of time
before they surface.
Although sustainability of the
resource base is an important re-
quisite for the subsistence of
fishermen, especially the unmotoris-
ed ones who are more dependent on
the coastal waters, no efforts have
been made to ensure its protection
from conflicting user-groups. Regula-
tion of access to resources like the
trawl ban for example, would be
translated into positive results in the
long run only if complementary
measures are taken to protect
wetland areas needed for fish and
crustacean breeding grounds. This in
turn is further related to the nature
and intensity of economic activities in
the upstream regions.
Thus, as Yamamoto (op. cit.)
points out, the main reason for the
narrowing of the fishery in
Bagansiapi-api, leading to forced
migration of trawlers into northern
Java, was the large discharge of mud
into the sea following heavy logging
along the coast of Rokan river in
Sumatra. As the MOA, GF, ADB
(op. cit) study points out, there is in-
creasing pressure on coastal
resources in densely populated areas
like Java from expansion of urban
areas, forestry practices in the
upstream regions (1), industrialisa-
tion, modern methods of agriculture,
intensification of aquaculture etc. that
are all affecting both the quality and
quantity of discharges from rivers and
the quality of the coastal waters.
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(1) « Deforestation will affect the coastal fisheries more slowly, but may ultimately be a more serious threat to the livelihood
of Indonesian fishermen, particularly small-scale fishermen forced to operate near land» (ibid).
33
Although there is a ban on conversion
of mangroves in the 200 metre
greenbelt, it is not being observed
(ibid.). Unless there is an integrated
system for management that
minimises conflicts between different
user-groups of coastal resources, the
long-term interests of the subsistence
fishermen will be jeopardised ir-
respective of the ban on trawling.
At the level of management of
resources and development of small-
scale fishermen, we have tried to
show how two of the main objectives
of the trawling ban have not been
successful. Our perusal of the credit
policy of the government also reveals
its bias towards aquaculture. The
priorities of the government are still
in the old groove of enhancement of
production for the export market,
reflected in the excessive importance
attached to the development of
tuna/skipjack fishery recently in In-
donesia. Moreover, as we have men-
tioned elsewhere only 4 per cent of the
total expenditure of the Department
of Fisheries is meant for resource
management. Though the ban could
have been a very good beginning for
the development of an integrated
resource management system,
nothing has happened after its im-
position in the early-80s. 
At the same time, it is really doubt-
ful whether the ban was really intend-
ed to serve any management purpose
because according to well-placed
sources in the Fisheries Department,
there was never any suggestion from
their department for the imposition
of the ban. (1) The department was
mainly in favour of proper enforce-
ment of the zoning system, which they
had devised. The ban was a unilateral
decision of the President of Indonesia
and it the first Presidential interven-
tion in Indonesian fisheries.
Contrary to what Bailey et al con-
tend that «prior to Presidential Decree
39, President Soeharto consulted with
the government’s fisheries policy
makers and scientists» and «they
largely sup-ported the imposition of a
trawl ban» (Bailey et al op. cit.), such
consulta-tions do not seem to have
taken place. Apparently, there were
dis-cussions only with the leaders of
the All Indonesian Fishermen’s
Organisa-tion (HNSI), a constituent of
the ruling GOLKAR (2) under the
tutelage of President Soeharto. After
the imposition of the ban, the Depart-
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(1) Interestingly and understandably, the fisheries officials and researchers revealed this information only when I asked
them specifically whether it was they who made the suggestion to ban trawling to the President!
(2) «GOLKAR is an agglomeration of bodies representing at present over 2,000 occupational groupings ranging from
civil servants and security personnel to women and fishermen». Its main function is to support government policies
(See Thoolen, H. 1987). 
ment of Fisheries was caught in a
peculiar situation of having to defend
the parenthood of a child who was not
theirs! Hence the tongue-in-cheek
nature of their studies on the ban.
Moreover, because of the unique
political atmosphere in Indonesia
there is a certain hesitation to call a
spade a spade. I do not know to what
extent it is true, but according to one
of my sources, the then Director
General of Fisheries Mr. Sardjono lost
his job because he showed the
‘audacity’ to defend the trawlers!
The motive behind the ban
If we look at macro indicators it
can be seen that fisheries do not form
a significant source of Indonesia’s ex-
port earnings. They accounted for on-
ly 1.3 percent of total Indonesian
exports in 1985 and 4.3 percent of
non-petroleum exports. Its share is
bound to have been lower in 1981
when the ban was imposed. Thus,
although in absolute terms the coun-
try had to forego an annual average
earnings of about US$ 200 million
from 1981 to 1983, this may not have
been substantial considering the ac-
tive oil market in the early 1980s (1).
Perhaps an intended economic objec-
tive for the ban was to redirect scarce
capital from over-exploited shrimp
resource grounds in certain areas to
grossly under-exploited tuna/skipjack
fisheries and tambak production of
prawns.
But a plausible objective of the
ban is the resolution of physical con-
flicts between trawlers and gill-net
fisheries which were exacerbating
from the mind 1970s leading to
destruction of property, bloodshed
and loss of lives. The government
must have realized that the price in
terms of export exchange earnings
foregone is worthwhile, considering
the social, economic and political
price they would have had to pay
otherwise.
The government seemed to have
had an overt and a covert motive for
banning trawling. Thus, according to
HNSI, the legitimate mouthpiece of
Indonesian fishermen (particularly of
the non-Chinese fishermen)
maintenance of law and order in the
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(1) The losses suffered by the government have always been much more in terms of illegal exports and transfer pric-
ing. As the MOA, DGF, ADB study (1988) contends «The bulk (of shrimp exports) is transferred at sea and transported
directly to the Japanese market. Sets of Indonesian data on harvest and export of marine shrimp differ considerably
from each other and from Japanese import data». Secondly, the f. o. b prices to Singapore (which accounts for 11
percent of Indonesian shrimp exports) are generally reported as only half of what they actually are. And thirdly, there
are losses resulting from the re-export of Indonesian-processed shrimp from Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
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archipelagic water is of paramount
importance in Indonesia. The
fishermen, according to the ruling
GOLKAR, have to provide the effec-
tive communication-links bet-ween
islands. Since the process of in-
tegrating all Indonesians into one na-
tionality is still in progress, the waters
separating these six thousand and
odd inhabited islands (out of 13,700)
have to be kept peaceful. Moreover,
according to HNSI, the Govt. of In-
donesia is trying to revoke the Dutch
colonial policy, which tried to keep the
islands separate from each other to
exercise easy control. But the con-
cept of nationality is still in its nascent
stage for most Indonesians (1).
Regarding this objective, the govern-
ment was completely successful and
there are no more stories of violence
in the sea after the declaration of the
ban.
The following section will discuss
the covert motive behind the ban.
Although the «political» aspect has
been mentioned, its importance vis-
à-vis other objectives has not been
highlighted. Most of the writing on the
ban is in the form of rhetoric to pro-
vide a semblance of «scientificity» to
the decision. Moreover, the ethnic
dimension to the entire conflict has
not been discussed except for a pass-
ing mention (Chong, Chee-Chai op.
cit.). This section is based on discus-
sions with the leaders of All Indonesia
Fishermen Organisation (HNSI),
political activists, scientists and
bureaucrats and field workers of the
FAO Extension Programme.
The political factor
As anybody in the office of the
Director General of Fisheries or for
that matter, any scientist involved in
research on demersal fisheries will tell
you, the ban is a « political» deci-
sion. Even the then Director General
of Fisheries called it a «political deci-
sion» (Sardjono, l. 1980). The implica-
tion of the word «political» is the
covert objective of the ban.
As we have mentioned in the
beginning, trawling was introduced
for the first time in Indonesia by the
Chinese entrepreneurs. Even in the
later period almost all the trawlers in
operation were of the ‘Cung-King’
type and built in Sumatra. Even today
not only in trawl fishing, but in the
SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1
(1) «Depending on to whom he is speaking, an Indonesian will identify himself usually first by his village, then his
ethnic group, and lastly when meeting a foreigner, his country..…the view that an Indonesian takes of his country is
affected by the place of his ethnic group in the scheme of things. There are some 300 such groups, differing
considerably in size» (Palmier, L 1985).
entire range of medium and large
large scale operations, the people of
Chinese ethnic origin control the
fishery sector. This is so in the case
of aquaculture too. Their involvement
is rather fully inte-grated: the entire
gamut of produc-tion, processing and
marketing is controlled. According to
one of my sources, their involvement
is near total in Sumatra and Kaliman-
tan and about fifty percent in the
island of Java. In the traditional sec-
tor too, the Chinese are controlling
the markets for fishing/ processing
accessories, product and credit. Thus
one can say that they control the en-
tire fishing industry of Indonesia.
Their operations are generally
resented and considered to be highly
exploitative in character.
The resentment within the fishing
community, particularly of fishermen
native in origin, against the Chinese
has also a broader backdrop in the
Indonesian economy. The Chinese
(called ‘peranakans’) though believ-
ed to number only about 4 million out
of a total population of 155 million of
so (1), control a major share of
domestic capital in Indonesia.
Perhaps because of their wealth and
their attempts to maintain their own
distinct identity, the Chinese are wide-
ly disliked by the Pribomi
(autochthonous Indonesians). This is
in spite of the government’s attempts
to assimilate the Chinese into the ma-
jority culture through various means.
As Palmier observes (1985):
«All this forced homogeneity does not
so far seem to make much difference
to the dislike in which the Chinese are
held».
But one should also stress the
point that the native dislike is directed
more against the Chinese capitalists
than against the peasants and
workers of Chinese origin.
The decision taken to ban trawl-
ing is inextricably linked with the
political atmosphere prevailing in In-
donesia after Soeharto became the
President in 1968. Two factors are
relevant in the political milieu: firstly,
the resentment among zealot
Muslims, in Indonesia not being
declared as an Islamic state (See
Palmier, L. ibid.; May, B. op. cit.) and
secondly, the anti-Chinese feelings
in the mainstream society. Since the
business involvements of Soeharto
and his circle with Chinese Cukongs
(financiers) are well established (See
May. B op. cit.) and his apathy
towards making Indonesia into an
Islamic state is well known, the
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(1) «No account has been taken of ethnic origin since the 1930 census» (Palmier. L ibid.).
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resentment of political Muslims is also
directed against Soeharto.
The conflicts that broke out on
the fisheries front got the support of
Muslim leaders and it was largely
aimed at the Chinese. These conflicts
should be seen as a protraction of
ethnic riots within the mainstream
society and these riots were increas-
ing in frequency in the 1970s. There
was a particularly bad anti-Chinese
riot in Bandung, Western Java in
1973. According to some of my
sources, more and more people from
the non-fishing community were join-
ing the struggle against trawlers
mainly because of ethnic reasons
and by the late-1970s it was threaten-
ing to acquire extremely grave dimen-
sions. The Muslim zealots were also
trying to use the issue to chastise
Soeharto for his alleged support to
Chinese capitalists.
The ban was a useful piece of
strategy to gain political capital on the
eve of 1982 elections with intresting
ramifications. On the one hand,
Soeharto could portray himself as a
true friend of the Pribomi and the
poor: to the extent the decision was
aimed at (or affected) the Chinese
owners it was pro-Pribomi; and to the
extent it benefited the traditional
fishermen it was pro-poor. Thus, in
one shot the P.D. could be portrayed
as a vehicle of his concern for the
Pribomi as well as the impoverished.
This aspect of the ban must have
silenced his Muslim critics to some
extent.
But it is interesting to observe
that although the P.D. ‘affected’ the
Chinese owners of trawlers, it ended
up greatly benefiting the Chinese
community as a whole. How did this
happen?
The most crucial benefit of the
ban was that the President prevented
the inter-gear conflicts from acquiring
larger dimensions at a time when the
conflicts were threatening to ag-
gravate racial tension. This, perhaps,
would have led to nation-wide ethnic
riots and would have been disastrous
for the Chinese community because
of their stake in the economy. The
ban contributed towards the dilution
of a major threat to their investments
in Indonesia although it restricted
their involve-ment in trawling. But
compared to the quantum of
domestic capital they control, the pro-
portion tied up in trawling was in-
significant. Moreover, trawling was
one among many avenues of invest-
ment: the ‘losses’ resulting from the
ban would have been insignificant
compared to the benefits they obtain-
ed in the form of «protection» to their
larger invest-ment in the rest of the
economy.
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Considering the nexus between
the New Order and the Chinese
capitalists (May, B. op. cit.; Palmier,
L. op. cit.), the large benefits at the
community level could not have just
been incidental. (1) Thus, through a
clever decision President Soeharto
became at once a friend of Pribomi,
of the poor and of the Chinese without
threatening to upset the well
established equation of power in the
economy.
Conclusion
Indonesia is the only country in
the world where trawling is proscrib-
ed in all areas where there is a
preponderance of traditional 
fishermen. Not only is it the largest
area-closure of trawl fishery, it also
has in place the longest uninterrupted
ban in the world. Thus, in waters west
of 120 degrees E longitude trawling
has been prohibited for the past nine
years and it is unlikely to be lifted in
the near future.
Though the professed objectives
are facilitation of better management
of resources, development of the
traditional sector and prevention of
open conflicts, only the last one has
been seriously adhered to.
Although the trawling ban is a
good beginning it has not led to fur-
ther development in, or initiative
towards better fisheries management.
In the Arafura sea, for example, in
spite of signs of overfishing of
prawns, no worthwhile measures
have been adopted for the conserva-
tion of prawn resources. Many
Japanese trawlers are in the process
of winding up their activity because
of high costs of operation arising from
lower production. Also no attempt
was made to provide base-line infor-
mation before the ban was imposed.
Other than the ban, precious lit-
tle has been done to reorganize the
fishery for sustainable harvesting of
resources. Destruction of mangroves,
removal of gravid females of prawns
for aquaculture, pollution and conflic-
ting interests of various sectors are
seriously jeopardising the conserva-
tion of resources in Indonesia. This,
in the long run, will have a serious
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(1) As Palmier, L observes,
«Some of their richest entrepreneurs are in close concert with prominent figures in the New Order. As a group, the
Chinese have undoubtedly benefited considerably from the measures of economic development taken by the
government» (Palmier, L op. cit.).
As May observes,
«the ruling junta of today use selected Chinese and the Chinese use them to accumulate wealth» (May, B op. cit.).
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bearing on the development of tradi-
tional fishermen.
The positive contributions of the
ban are: the government could put an
end to the bloody conflicts in the sea;
the traditional fishermen could suc-
cessfully replace trawling gear with
trammel-nets and produce as much
of prawns as was caught before the
ban. As a result at least some of the
traditional fishermen are now earning
more. The ban also provided a jolt in
the arm for the gill-net fishermen
leading to rapid increase in motorisa-
tion and the expansion of gearbase.
However there is no information on
distributional justice within the tradi-
tional sector, considering the highly
skewed ownership pattern of fishing
units in Indonesia.
More than the welfare of the
fishermen or conservation of
resources the motive behind the ban
was explicitly political because of the
complexity of ethnic factors and the
power structure in Indonesia. Con-
sciously or unconsciously, various at-
tempts have been made to
erroneously highlight the ban as a
progressive and bold step towards
resource conservation without at-
tempting an explanation of the
motives (and under currents) behind
the decision. The ban is fishery-
related only to the extent of mitigation
of open conflicts. In terms of other ob-
jectives, precious little has been at-
tempted or achieved. If not for the
sensitive nature of ethnic-politics,
perhaps this decision would not have
been taken by President Soeharto.
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With a coastline of over 1900 kmsPeninsular Malaysia produced
about 700,000 tonnes of fish in 1987.
About 53 percent of this was con-
tributed by trawlers, 22 percent by
purse-seiners and over 25 percent
traditional fisheries. Thus in Malaysia
the contribution of the commercial
sector (which includes only trawlers
and purse-seiners) is significantly
much higher than that of the tradi-
tional sector (which include all other
gear). After Thailand, this is the
country in the Southeast Asian region
with the smallest contribution from the
small-scale sector in marine fisheries.
The fisheries sector contributes
to about 2.3 percent of GDP, accounts
for 11 percent of total agricultural and
forestry production and is second only
to the Philippines in these respects
(1986 figures). It is one of the sources
of employment for the rural popula-
tion, employing less than 2 percent of
the total labour force in 1986. The
sector contributes to a little less than
1.0 percent of total foreign exchange
earnings (SEAFDEC 1986).
Fish constitutes about two-thirds
of the animal protein supply and a lit-
tle more than 50 percent of the total
protein supply in the country.
Malaysia has the highest propor-
tion of motorized fishing craft in the
Southeast Asian region. Of the
22,000 vessels, only 4 percent the
non-powered.
Unlike many of the Asian coun-
tries, Malaysia has a history of
gradual development of fishing
technology. In the first two decades
of the twentieth century, fishing
stakes were the most common fishing
gear. With the introduction of restric-
tions on their use by the British,
purse-seine — introduced into Malaya
in the late nineteenth century by a
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group of Chinese from Pakhoi in
South China — became more
popular, particularly so from the ear-
ly 1930s. This was also influenced by
the removal of duties on salted fish
(Ling, Y.C. 1976). Purse-seine fishery
further developed in the same decade
because of political developments
resulting from the Sino-Japanese
war (1). Mechanization was also in-
troduced around the same time in a
gradual manner. Synthetic materials
for fishing gear were introduced in the
1950s (Shari. l. 1985). Finally, in the
mid 1960s trawling was introduced on
the west coast of Malaysia from
Thailand. This was in Pangkor by
converting purse-seine boats into
trawlers.
As Shari points out (ibid.), the
development of fisheries technology,
particularly that of trawling and purse
seining, is the result of the
fishermen’s own initiative. This was
adequately supported by the govern-
ment through the development of in-
frastructure, improvement in
productive capacity of small-scale
fishermen, institutional improvement
in pricing and marketing facilities,
marine fisheries research etc.
However, this support was primarily
directed towards ethnic Malay
fishermen to the east coast.
The advent of trawling
The introduction of purse-seining
did not lead to any significant conflict.
But trawling sailed into rough waters
from the very year it was introduced.
This is quite unique because in most
of the countries where conflicts arose
as a result of trawling there was a
time lag between its introduction and
the emergence of conflicts. The non-
trawl, small-scale fishermen reacted
violently to trawling, «charging that it
was destroying their gear and would
deplete their fishing grounds» (Gib-
bons, D, 1976). The Government
postponed its decision to license
trawlers and undertook a pilot study
on the economic viability of trawling
in waters beyond 12 miles from shore
and more than 20 fathoms deep, i.e.,
away from the traditional fishing
grounds (Gibbons. Ibid.).
In late 1965 the government
decided to license trawlers through
co-operative trawling societies while
subjecting trawling to strict regula-
tions. These regulations were design-
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(1) The fresh fish market in the 1920-30 period was dominated by the Japanese fishermen operating more ami (bream
net) resulting in local purse-seine fishermen unable to make any dent into their market share. However, with the Sino-
Japanese war in the Far East, the local Chinese were reluctant to buy fish supplied by the Japanese. «There was a
definite bias against Japanese fishermen because prices for fish landed by local fishermen improved during that year,
while the prices for fish landed by the Japanese fishermen fell» (ibid). The Japanese fishermen were also denied
licences to fish by the British authorities.
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ed to ensure conservation of fishery
resources and to improve the securi-
ty atmosphere. As a result, licences
for trawling would be issued only
through registered co-operatives to
boats of and above 50 tonnes capaci-
ty and fishing beyond 12 miles from
the shore. These cooperatives, con-
verted from existing autonomous
(largely Chinese) co-operatives were
also asked to ensure the participation
of traditional fishermen, particularly
Malay fishermen.
This programme did not have the
desired impact because many
fishermen continued to practise
unlicensed trawling, particularly at
night, leading to the destruction of in-
shore gear like bag-nets (pompang)
and drift-nets (hanyut) (Gibbons, D.
ibid). Enforcement was very weak
largely due to inadequate enforce-
ment capacity and corruption of the
officials concerned. In addition, there
were loopholes in the law and the
fines were low.
The operation of trawlers also
directly clashed with the catch poten-
tial of a traditional gear called pukat
payang (boat –seine), thus adding to
the animosity of traditional fishermen
against trawlers. With the introduction
of trawling, the catch of this gear is
said to have dropped off dramatically.
The discontent and anger of tradi-
tional fishermen were precipitated by
an incident in late 1965 when an il-
legal trawler rammed into an inshore
boat leading to the destruction of the
boat and drowning of the crew. In-
shore fishermen attacked a trawler in
the same area, murdering eight of the
crew and burning the boat. In
December 1966 about 1,000 inshore
boats rallied to Weld Quay (Penang)
with the objective of burning the of-
fice of the George Town Co-operative
Trawling Society. They were dissuad-
ed by the police.
In the meantime, the inshore
fishermen formed a pressure-group,
the United Fishermen’s Organisation
of West Malaysia (UFOWM), in early
1964 to air their grievances to the
government, to mobilise public opi-
nion in their support and to provide
compensation for members whose
gear had been destroyed by trawlers.
It had branches in twenty six inshore
fishing villages on the west-coast.
Government’s response
to trawling
Ironically enough, in spite of all
the objections raised by the inshore
fishermen and the open conflicts in
the sea leading to destruction of pro-
perty and loss of life in the early 1970s
the government reduced the restric-
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tion of trawling, increased the
number of licences available for ex-
isting co-operatives and issued
licenes to new co-operatives in
Penang and Kedah. The regulation
on trawling and related procedures
were relaxed in three respects: the
size of boat, fishing area and fishing
time. The minimum tonnage of 50
was relaxed to include both medium
sized trawlers (25-30 tonnes) and mini
trawlers (< 10 GT). The minimum 12
mile limit was relaxed to 3 miles. A
zoning arrangement was introduced
dividing the trawlable grounds among
the trawlers according to horse
power. Thus, trawlers with engines of
60 HP and above had to fish in water
beyond 12 miles; with 25 HP to 60 HP
in water beyond 7 miles and those
with engines less than 25 HP had to
fish beyond 3 miles. The fishing time
was extended for those with 50 GT
and below from the diurnal hours to
twenty four hours on all days except
Sundays (Gibbons, ibid.).
The relaxation in government
policy vis-à-vis trawling was
presumably for facilitating the switch-
over by inshore fishermen to trawling
with the idea of eliminating conflicts.
However, the participation of tradi-
tional fishermen remained insignifi-
cant because there was no
government programme to finance or
subsidize the purchase of trawler
boats. The traditional fishermen were
also very reluctant to become crew-
members of trawlers because of fear
of social sanctions from their fellow
villagers. In addition, the incomes
from trawlers (for the crew) were not
significantly better than that from
traditional gear (Gibbons, D. ibid.). 
As a result, the trawler owners — who
are mostly Chinese — drew labour
from non-fishermen, mostly from the
Chinese community leading to a
change in the ethnic composition of
fishermen. The proportion of
fishermen who were Chinese increas-
ed from 33 percent in 1959 to 43 per-
cent in 1972. Thus, the government
policy to ensure better participation of
inshore fishermen, particularly Malays
in trawling was a gross failure. As
Gibbons observes,
«Only a minority of traditional
fishermen are participating in trawling
and most of the economic surplus
generated by this more productive
gear has been extracted by former
non-fishermen, especially business-
men, who have provided the capital to
finance trawling» (Gibbons, D. ibid.).
Similarly, enforcement of fishing
regulations through the co-operative
was also a failure. Contrary to the ob-
jective, the co-operatives seem to
have encouraged the trawlers to
violate the zoning arrangement
because they were entitled for a 5
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percent commission from the catch.
The co-operatives, the vehicle of
government policies, were not above
the structural limitation of the Malayan
economy and society. Gibbons
observes that these co-operatives are
‘not co-operatives at all in any mean-
ingful sense of the word’, they are
«cartels» (ibid.) of local political and
economic elites. He further observes
quite sharply:
«Manipulation of trawler co-operatives
by local elites for their own short-term
benefit... has been a major reason for
the ineffectiveness of these societies
in goal attainment. Control of these
cooperatives by local political and
economic elites was made likely by the
decision to open up membership to
non-fishermen, i.e., local political and
economic entrepreneurs and boat
owners. Such people were likely to be
elected to the committee... The chair-
man and/or secretary would be local
UMNO leaders, often the chairman
and secretary of the local UMNO
Branch; the treasurer, a Chinese
businessman, either a supplier of oil
and/or ice to the society or a boat
owner and fish dealer; and the rest of
the committee would contain other
local Malay notables often connected
with UMNO… Absent from the commit-
tee or present in very small numbers
would be active fishermen…» (Gib-
bons, D. ibid.)
The appropriation of co-operatives
by vested interests, political in-
terference in the issue of trawling
licences and the difference of en-
forcement officials resulted in the
worsening of conflicts in the 1970s.
These became very violent and
bloody.
As Teik, Goh Cheng observes:
«Between 1964 and 1976, a total of
113 incidents involving 437 trawlers
and 987 inshore vessels was record-
ed for the whole of west Malaysia. 45
vessels were destroyed; 62 vessels
sunk and 34 lives lost.» (Teik, G.C.
1976)
The response of the government
to the intensification of conflicts in the
early 1970s is intriguing. In 1974
Fisheries (Maritime) (Amendment)
Regulations, 1974 was legislated.
These regulations further liberalised
the terms and conditions of license for
trawling. The inshore waters
designated for the traditional
fishermen remained the same. But
the horsepower specifications for all
the zones were relaxed. Thus boats
of 60 HP and below could be
operated in waters beyond 3 miles
provided they were below 25 GT and
vessels with 60 HP to 200 HP (25
GT-100 GT) in waters beyond 7 miles.
And those with an HP of more than
200 (and 100 GT) in waters beyond
12 miles.
There was a further relaxation
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for trawlers operating from the east
coast. Between November and March
(the fishing season), trawlers irrespec-
tive of size could operate at any
distance from the east coast.
However, the new licensing policy
did not have any uniformity across
states. Since the maximum number
of licences that can be issued was not
specified, the respective states issued
as many according to their discretion.
The conflict was further worsened by
the new legislation which resulted in
the rapid fleet expansion of «mini»
trawlers, (trawlers below 20 GT, but
mostly below 10 GT). Enforcement
continued to be very weak. In Perak,
for example, there was only one boat
to undertake enforcement. The
Fisheries Department had to fre-
quently resort to assistance from
marine police.
Conflict management
A concerted effort was made to
alleviate conflicts through the
Fisheries (Amendment) Regulation of
1980 which restructured the existing
zoning system. In addition, a new
licensing policy called Fisheries com-
prehensive Licensing policy (FCLP)
was introduced to limit the fishing ef-
fort (Abu Bakar H.S. & Looi, Ch’ng
kim 1987).
According to the new zoning ar-
rangement, the existing reservation of
inshore waters up to three miles for
traditional fishermen was further ex-
tended to 5 miles for ‘artisanal,
owner-operated vessels’ (Yahaya, J.
1988). However, the horse power
specification was removed and the
designation of zones was made ac-
cording to gross tonnage of the
vessel. Thus, trawlers and purse-
seiners below 40 GT and owner-
operated are assigned 5-12 miles
zone; those above 40 GT, wholly
owned and operated by Malaysian
fishermen, the 12-30 miles zone and
those vessels above 70 GT under
joint venture or foreign ownership,
waters beyond 30 miles.
The zones 5-12 miles and 12-30
miles were specifically reserved for
trawlers and purse-seiners but
beyond 30 miles any vessel could
operate.
The new arrangement thus
allocates fishing grounds according
to fishing gear, size of vessel and
ownership status now.
In addition to the zoning arrange-
ment and license limitation, mesh size
regulations for the cod end of trawl-
nets were extended from 1 inch to 1.5
inches and beam trawlers were strict-
ly prohibited. The issue of additional
licences for trawlers within  12 miles
46
FISHING LEGISLATION IN ASIA
47
was frozen.
Finally, with the adoption of
Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone,
Parliament enacted the Fisheries Act
of 1985. In addition to imposing heavy
fines on poaching vessels from
abroad, the Act also enhanced the
fine on local trawlers and purse-
seiners encroaching into prohibited
waters. It was raised from $ 1000
(Malaysia) to $ 50,000 and/or two
years of imprisonment. The enforce-
ment officers were also given vast
powers. The main objective of the Act
according to the then Agricultural
Minister Anwer Ibrahim is ‘to protect
inshore fishermen who have been
complaining of irresponsible
fishermen trespassing into their
fishing grounds’ (Star 24.4.1985).
Fishing legislation:
an analysis
The fishing regulations during the
colonial times were framed with the
idea of resource conservation, as it
was in the case of almost all the Asian
countries. These regulations date
back to restrictions on various types
of fishing stakes (1909-1916 and the
gradual prohibition of the most
destructive types in Perak in the ear-
ly 1920s (World Bank 1983). The
legislation was in the form of or-
dinances, enactments or orders-in-
council. A unified system of regula-
tion was introduced in 1923 to co-
ordinate and control fishing activities
for the whole country.
After the independence of
Malaysia in 1957, a new Fisheries Act
of 1963 was introduced with the ob-
jectives:
«to conserve a natural resource; to ra-
tionalise its utilisation of exploitation,
to safeguard the interests of
fishermen, to administer fishing activi-
ty by preventing or settling any
disputes among fishermen, prices
etc.» (Notes on the Fisheries Act
(F.M. 8 of 1963)).
The act also delineated fisheries
into federal or state concerns on
geographical basis. Accordingly,
maritime and estuarine fisheries
became the Federal responsibility
and riverine fisheries, the State’s
responsibility.
From the objective of the Act it
is clear that conflict management was
one of the important objectives. The
Act also stressed the fact that
«the question of legislation could
never be separated from that of
observance and enforcement…» 
However, in this respect the
Malaysian Fisheries Department has
not yet been fully successful.
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The role of regulation in
ameliorating conflicts was further
reiterated when the Fisheries Com-
prehensive Licensing Policy (FCLP)
was introduced. This underlies the
current programme of fisheries
management in Malaysia. The objec-
tives of FCLP included among others
the following:
1. Elimination of competition and con-
flict between traditional and trawler
fishermen in the inshore water;
2. Prevention of over-exploitation of
the resources in the inshore waters
and,
3. Equitable distribution of resources
(Abu Baker, H.S. & Looi C.K. op.
cit.).
Thus, right from 1963 the govern-
ment had taken cognizance of con-
flicts in the fisheries sector and ever
since trawling was introduced, efforts
were made to contain them. Even the
definition of traditional and commer-
cial sector is according to the percep-
tion of disputes. Thus, commercial
sector includes all trawlers and purse-
seiners (irrespec-tive of craft size and
gear, horse power and fishing
ground) and the traditional sector all
other gear. According to this defini-
tion, many of the capital- intensive
gear like drift-nets, bobu traps, etc.
are considered to be traditional.
In the Asian region, after Japan
this is perhaps the first country where
acute conflicts arose in the sea after
the introduction of a more efficient
gear like trawling. And in the history
of world fisheries this is perhaps the
most bloody conflict claiming
numerous lives. For a period of
almost fifteen years from 1965, there
were frequent clashes, destruction of
fishing craft and loss of lives.
The trawlers are mostly owned by
the Chinese who are mostly fish
dealers and/or businessmen and who
do not go to the sea (called towkays).
(1) However, the conflicts cannot be
characterized as an ethnic conflict
because many traditional Chinese
fishermen are also involved in the
fights with trawlers. According to Mr.
Cheah Eng Kean, formerly the Head
of Planning and Development Divi-
sion, Fisheries Department, in one in-
cident, 33 Chinese trawler workers
were killed in Perak by the traditional
Chinese fishermen from that region.
At the same time, it cannot be said
that ethnic factors have not played
any role in the tensions. Like in In-
donesia, in Malaysia too there is
social tension between the Chinese
and the indigenous groups. There are
anti-Chinese feelings among the
traditional fishermen, but at the same
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(1) According to a survey conducted by Gibbons (1976) more than 90 percent of trawler owners in
Kedah and Penang states were of Chinese origin.
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time these are directed more against
the absentee-owners of trawlers than
against small fishermen from the
Chinese community. Expectedly, in
all the conflicts, none of the towkays
lost their lives. Only trawler workers
were killed.
Enforcement of fisheries
regulations
The violation of inshore waters
and destruction of fishing gear still
continue (though of low frequency) in
the west coast in spite of beefing up
of enforcement and more com-
prehensive management policies.
These are caused by pair trawlers
mostly below 10 GT, popularly known
as «Apollo» boats. However, the in-
tensity of conflicts has been reducing
over time in the 1980s. There are now
no open conflicts, no destruction of
boats and no loss of lives. Protest is
expressed through demonstrations
and petitions. Can the de-escalation
of violence be attributed to improve-
ment in enforcement?
Malaysia has a relatively long
history of legislation for the purpose
of eliminating conflicts (and their
violation by fishermen!). The inade-
quacies of enforcement have been
highlighted by many authors (Yahaya,
S. and Yamamoto 1988; Yahaya S.
1988; Gibbons D. op. cit). Legisla-
tion, although undertaken with an
under-standing of the situation, does
not seem to have contributed
sub-stantially to the present im-
provement.
According to Yahaya and
Yamamoto (op.cit) there are three
reasons for poor enforcement. First-
ly, enforcement efforts are hampered
by limited capabilities arising from
shortage of operating funds, patrol
vessels, personnel etc. Secondly,
there are procedural difficulties aris-
ing from too many bureaucratic for-
malities in cases that involve the
judicial machinery. Often there is
political interference as well in the
legal process. Thirdly, co-ordination
among the various agencies respon-
sible for enforcement is lacking.
As the Head of the Legislation
Department observes in a joint paper,
«Fisheries enforcement…, is not effec-
tive against the operation of illegal en-
croachment of trawlers into the A zone
(0-5 miles) or in ensuring that the
boats fish only in their authorized
zones. Almost no enforcement occurs
along the boundaries of the B and C
zones. Although coordinated enforce-
ment between the Fisheries Depart-
ment and other enforcement agencies
has been initiated…this has been ef-
fective only against illegal foreign
vessels» (Abu Baker and Looi, C K,
op. cit.).
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Even the premises on which ma-
jor decisions like FCLP are taken
seem questionable. Imposing restric-
tion on fishing effort presupposes
reliable information on fisheries
resources:
«Existing data on stock abundance,
recruitment and mortality rate, catch
rates, types of species, etc are so
meagre and fragmentary that they
really cannot serve as the basis for ar-
riving at any definite conclusion about
the status of the fisheries resources»
(Yahaya & Yamamoto op. cit.).
Since the basic information is
unreliable, it is difficult to assess the
extent of overfishing (if at all it is tak-
ing place as contended).
The results of resource surveys
undertaken by the Fisheries
Research Institute indicate that the
MSY has been exceeded. However,
these surveys, according to the above
authors, are «merely indicative» and
not  «conclusive» of the status of the
«fisheries resources»(ibid.). Thus, for
example, average annual production
for the decade 1971-1980 for the west
coast had been 340,000 tonnes
though the estimated annual MSY is
only 250,000 tonnes! It has been con-
sistently higher in the 1980s peaking
at 500,000 tonnes in 1987. If the MSY
estimate is to be believed, the
resources on the west coast have
been continuously overfished for the
past seventeen years which is quite
ridiculous. (1)
The status of information on fin
fish, prawns and mollusks is also very
meager. Fishery managers are
therefore, unable to confidently deter-
mine the number of licences to be
issued by types of fishery, gear and
area (ibid). As a result, the fisheries
officials have to «resort to intuitions
and arbitrations» (ibid.) in deciding on
certain regulatory measures. This
often leads to criticism by fishermen,
politicians and other government
agencies.
Political factors in
legislation
As in other countries, political fac-
tors are very crucial in the formula-
tion and implementation of legislation
in Malaysia. The socio-economic en-
vironment is manipulated by the elite
hegemony (2) (for details see Gibbons
op. cit.) to attain their political ends.
This, in combination with the «subject
political culture» — defined as «one
in which a person has some
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(1) Although the total catch has increased, Dr. Christy points out a significant shift in composition to lower valued
species. He also observes that a price-weighted output index shows declining production.
(2) They belong to all ethnic groups, predominantly Malay.
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knowledge about his political system,
especially about the bureaucracy, but
does not see any active role for
himself in it» (ibid.) — has created
extra-legal space within the law’s
boundaries. With the result there is
a lot of tentativeness in enforcement.
Above every thing else, political
intervention seems to be the most im-
portant reason for poor enforcement.
Thus, for example, the government
relented under pressure when
trawler-operators agitated against the
enhancement in fines  (for the viola-
tion of zones) and the zoning arrange-
ment. According to press reports,
(Star 12.5.85) after a demonstration
by trawlers in Kedah state, the
government relaxed (informally) the
closed area for trawlers from 5 miles
to 3 miles from the shore. Similarly,
the then Agriculture Minister Anwar
Ibrahim guaranteed the trawler
owners that they had been «misled»
on the $ 50, 000 fine imposed on
trawlers found fishing in prohibited
waters. As Star quotes him (May 15,
1985):
«This maximum fine will be imposed
only on big fishing boats and foreign
fishing boats which have encroached
into Malaysian waters».
Obviously, the attempt is to pacify
both traditional and commercial
fishermen to soften the jagged points
of conflict even if it leads to relaxa-
tion of legislation which is presumably
designed to protect the interest of
traditional fishermen. This is further
evident from the following statement
made by the same Minister in Kedah:
«The enforcement of the zoning could
not be totally called off but we would
relax the enforcement a little to benefit
them (meaning trawler operators). We
will allow them to cross about as far as
one mile into the prohibited zones»
(Star. ibid.) (parenthesis added).
As a report of the working Group
(1976) points out: 
«in the territorial waters the objective
(of enforcement) is the maintenance
of a peaceful balance of the interests
of competing fishing activities» (paren-
thesis added) «whereas in the EEZ
waters the objective is to conserve and
protect the fisheries resources for the
benefit of Malaysian fishermen» (P 33).
It is this maintenance of a
«peaceful balance of interests» which
has led to a certain degree of am-
bivalence in fisheries legislation. The
criterion at the point of implementa-
tion is explicitly political, although at
the level of legislation the objectives
are lofty. The process of legislation
and implementation in a sense sum-
marise the relative political clout of
both the Chinese and the Malay com-
munities in a society where every
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economic activity is influenced by the
ethnic factor.
The ambivalence in legislation for-
mulated with the main intention of
resolving inter-gear conflicts is further
reflected in the shroud of secrecy vis-
à-vis the detailed provisions of these
Acts and amendments. The logistical
aspects and details of enforcement
are confidential and inaccessible,
presumably because of the sensitive
nature of this information. Various
criteria governing the nature of im-
plementation is also a State secret.
The detailed provisions are in the
form of an Administrative Manual (in
Malay) which again is a confidential
document.
Both traditional and commercial
fishermen have a lot of political clout
and they have their spokesmen in
Parliament. Since the government is
a coalition of Malay, (Chinese and In-
dian communities (it is better to
describe it as a coalition of the elites
of these communities) the basic at-
titude is to keep the conflicting par-
ties separate rather than to resolve
the conflicts. At the peak of the ten-
sion between trawlers and traditional
fishermen in the 1970s the function
of the enforcement authorities was to
keep the warring parties separate
rather than enforcement per se (per-
sonal discussion with Mr. Cheah Eng
Kean, formerly head of Planning &
Development, Department of
Fisheries, Kuala Lumpur).
Similarly, enhancement of the fine
from $ 1000 to 50,000 is mainly a
deterrent measure not meant to be
actually implemented. According to
the fisheries officials I talked to, there
are no cases where the violators of
zoning arrangement are fined, they
are only warned if they are Malaysian
nationals. Fining or prosecution is
resorted to only in the case of foreign
violators. (1)
What is quite interesting to
observe in Malaysia is that in spite of
the lackadaisical performance of the
enforcement authorities, tension in
the sea has considerably reduced
during the 1980s. The burning
cauldrons of Perak and Penang
states have now cooled down
significantly.
This must be related to the recent
changes in the fisheries sector and
economic development in Malaysia.
Between 1980 and 1987 the marine
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(1) As Dr. Christy has pointed out, fines have been levied in quite a few cases. According to the Annual Fisheries
Statistics, 1987 almost 50 percent of the total fisheries revenue is from fines — the single largest source of revenue
for the Department of Fisheries. But there is no break-up of the fine according to it’s origin, therefore, we do not know
the relative share of revenue arising from various violations. These fines contribute to 0.0014 percent of the total value
of marine landings in 1987.
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fishermen’s population has declined
by 30 percent from 90,000 to 60,000.
In the same period, the total number
of large scale gear (trawl and purse-
seine) registered an increase from 18
to 29 percent and small scale gears
(mostly gill/drift nets — about 64 per-
cent — and gear like hook and line,
portable traps, other seines etc.)
decreased from 76 to 61 percent.
When the total number of unpowered
and outpowered units decreased from
37 to 33 percent, inboard units
registered an increase from 63 to 67
percent. The data implicitly shows the
mobility of fishermen from small-scale
to large-scale operations. This must
have considerably weakened the
clout of the gill-net fishermen and
perhaps this is one of the reasons for
the de-escalation of conflicts.
The decline in the fishermen’s
population is due to inter-sectoral
mobility arising from the development
of industries in the coastal regions
and the government-sponsored
relocation programme of fishermen.
This programme envisages the
relocation of 10,500 fishermen under
the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990)
into agriculture, manufacturing, small
scale business, aquaculture and off-
shore fishing at an estimated cost of
M$ 280 million. It has already
relocated 1,400 fishermen between
1976 and 1984 (Hotta, M and Wang,
L.T., 1985).
As Yamamoto and Yahaya (1988)
have observed in their survey in
Penang, youth are also able to find
jobs in the growing industrial sector.
A decline in the number of
fishermen seeking to exploit available
resources seems to have contributed
more to the reduction in tension than
stringent legislation.
Awareness of legislation
What is the extent of awareness
of fishing legislation among the
fishermen? According to a survey
conducted by Yamamoto and Yahaya
(op.cit) in fishing villages in Penang
state
«nearly 78 percent of those interview-
ed said that they were very aware of
the restricted licensing, 16.5 percent
said they were aware and those not
aware only 5.8 percent» (ibid.).
They further observe
«It is interesting to note that the
percentage reporting awareness of
specific programmes was highest for
those programmes which affect the
fishermen directly, but declined with
programmes which has not direct effect
on them. For example, among the
FOH (Fishing Operators’ Households)
with inboard powered boats, nearly 80
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«percent of those interviewed said that
they were very aware of the regulation
banning trawling in the 0-5 mile waters,
while only 52.5 percent reported that
they were very aware of the minimum
mesh size regulation meant for the
trawler fishermen…»
Conclusion
Malaysia is perhaps the first coun-
try in the South and Southeast Asian
region which introduced legislation for
«eliminating» conflicts between dif-
ferent gear-groups and for reducing
overfishing. The earliest Act in this
regard (1963) also highlighted the im-
portance of enforcement. Different
measures were undertaken with self-
defeating results leading to a strange
situation where the government had
to promote the spread of trawling
technology to prevent disputes that
arose from its introduction! Subse-
quently, different forms of zoning ar-
rangements were brought into force,
but to no avail. Finally, the Fisheries
Comprehensive Licensing Policy
(FCLP) was introduced in 1981 but it
could not plug the loopholes in the
system nor could it be implemented
properly. Restrictions on size of the
vessel, for example, are not match-
ed with any on horsepower resulting
in trawlers below 25 tonnes using up-
to 270 HP engines! (1) (from personal
dis-cussion with fishermen). Zoning
violations by local fishermen are not
punished, thus underscoring the
redundancy of a steep enhancement
in fines. But use of illegal gear is
fined.
Of late, it is not the absence of a
machinery but the ineffective use of
it that is responsible for zoning viola-
tions within their EEZ. The Enforce-
ment Branch has even got air
surveillance facilities now but these
are used only for detecting foreign
vessels poaching in their waters.
From my discussion with fishermen
in Penang  & Perak states and the
study done by Yamamoto and
Yahaya (op.cit) it is quite evident that
the inshore fishermen, operating gill-
nets/-drift-nets are aware of the law’s
provisions. At the same time they are
also aware that these regulations are
not implemented. Thus according to
Yamamoto and Yahaya (op. cit) only
about 9 percent of the respondents
believed that the trawl ban within 5
miles is being very effective.
In spite of primacy of equity con-
siderations and elimination of con-
flicts in the legislation, the measures
devised seem to be largely ‘used’ ac-
cording to the context by a govern-
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(1) These are only for the illegal Apollo boats and they are used as a means of evading patrol vessels, which is
perhaps an indication that enforcement is having at least some effect.
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ment which is more interested in the
maintenance of the hegemony of the
elite irrespective of ethnicity (though
with more stress on Malay) than in the
achievement of professed objectives.
Equity and other social considerations
are subsumed under the political in-
terest of the government which is an
amalgamation of three distinct and in-
congruous ethnicities. Within the per-
missible limits of dissent and protest,
conflicting parties are offered solu-
tions depending on the degree of in-
tensity of conflict and political
convenience. Nevertheless, the point
holds that Malaysia is the first
developing country to attempt
seriously to limit fishing effort in
response to indications of overfishing. 
The situation is also complicated
by the nature or organisations of con-
flicting groups. Both the commercial
and the traditional sectors are power-
fully organised. What is more crucial
is the fact that the government can-
not do away with the support of either
of the two. This is further complicated
by the structure of the fishery.
Trawlers and purse-seiners account
for only 23 percent of the total number
of gear units (1987) but they account
for 42 percent of employment in the
fisheries sector and for 75 percent of
production. The main traditional gear
(drift/gill-nets), though accounting for
54 percent of the total number of
gear, contributes to only 6 percent of
production (38 percent of employ-
ment). More than 75 percent of trawl-
nets and 80 percent of drift/gill-nets
in operation are on the west coast
(1987 figures).
What seem essential in any pro-
cess of legislation and its implemen-
tation is political will and general
awareness. The efficacy of legislation
viz., legitimacy, is also related to
these two factors. But in a society
where different social/economic
groups have political leverage, it is
highly unlikely that legislation will be
permanently used to the detriment of
a powerful group. It has only the role
of a palliative. In a country where a
common property resource viz.,
forests, are indiscriminately exploited,
we cannot expect a genuine concern
for another common property
resource. As the Working Group
(1979) contended, it is the
«maintenance of a peaceful balance
of the interests of competing fishing
activities» that is attempted and not
the elimination of conflict or the con-
servation of resources.
But then the situation seems to
have improved in the 1980s. The fre-
quency of conflicts has declined and
they have lost their intensity. This is
largely due to the growth in the
economy, which allowed those who
are not relocated to move into other
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employment. The role of overall
growth in the economy contributing
to the resolution of inter-gear disputes
has to be systematically looked into.
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From a fairly modest output of300,000 tonnes in 1953 the total
fishery production in the Philippines
increased to two million tonnes in
1986, contributing to about 5.11 per-
cent to the Gross National Product.
The fishing industry comprises mainly
of three sectors: municipal, commer-
cial and aquaculture. The municipal
sector, which comprises all fishing
craft below 3 GT and those
fishermen not using a craft, is the
most important among the three.
About 52 percent of total production
(46 percent of value) was contributed
by this sector in 1986. The commer-
cial sector comprising all fishing crafts
above 3 GT contributed to 26 percent
of production and 25 percent of value.
About 700,000 people are fully
or partially dependent on fishing as a
source of livelihood. Nearly 90 per-
cent of those engaged in fishing are
in the municipal sector (Spoehr,A.
1984). These fishermen can be
classified into three types:
a) Farmer-fishermen, those who
farm their land and normally fish
during the monsoon time,
b) Agriculture labourer-fishermen,
those who complement their
agricultural wages with income
from fishing particularly during
the monsoon and,
c) Full-time fishermen.
The ownership pattern of the
means of  production is skewed with
a large number of fishermen not own-
ing a craft (ibid). The distribution of
fishermen across the Philippines is
uneven with 40 percent of them
located in Southern Tagalog, Bicol,
and Central Visayas (Smith, I.R. et al
1980).
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T H E  P H I L I P P I N E S
Brief history of
the Philippine fisheries
The developments in Philippine
fisheries can be broadly classified into
pre-World War II and post-War
phenomena. Most of the major
changes in Philippine fishery are of
post-War phenomenon. Before the
War, fishery was mainly dominated by
the Chinese and the Japanese. The
Chinese introduced gill-nets, cast-
nets and a large lever-net called
Salambaw into the Philippines in the
18th century when Manila was a
growing city. Trawling was introduc-
ed by the Japanese in the early 20th
century when they operated beam
trawls with sailing sampans. The
establishment of a technological base
in tandem with the development of a
market in Manila led to the
emergence of fishing towns in the
1900s. An entrepreneurial class of
non-fishing owners rose up as a result
and in the years soon after the War
they adopted trawling / purse-seining
to increase production (Spoehr, A. op.
cit.).
The subsistence sector, mainly
due to marketing bottlenecks, remain-
ed dormant during the pre-War period
though they already had a repertoire
of techniques in accor-dance with the
diversity of species. But with the
development of markets, technolo-
gical improvements resulting from
motorisation, use of synthetic fibres
and change of boat size, there were
changes in the municipal sector in the
post-War years. However, the sector
still remained one of low productivi-
ty, primarily because of overfishing in
the narrow fishing grounds in the
land-sea interface. But in spite of this,
it has contributed the most to produc-
tion and Gross National product.
It is quite interesting to notice that
many of the problems beleaguering
the Philippine fisheries today were
already manifest from the 1930s
when beam trawling became very
popular. Thus, as early as 1940, there
was the promulgation of an ad-
ministrative order closing San Miguel
Bay to trawl fishing for five months in
a year. By 1950, Manila Bay, 
S.W. Samar and Regay Gulf were
already overfished so much so that
the fishery reached a point of com-
mercial extinction resulting in trawlers
switching to basing (bag-net), fish car-
riers, cargo movers, etc. Similarly,
destructive fishing practices were also
rampant. According to a source, the
most important cause of fish deple-
tion in the Visayas sea in the late
1950s was the rampant and wanton
use of explosives.
58
FISHING LEGISLATION IN ASIA
59
Conflicts in the
coastal waters
Though depletion of resources
and over-capitalization of fisheries are
mentioned, there is no reference to
conflicts between trawlers and
municipal fishermen in fisheries
literature until the early 1980s.
Perhaps, these conflicts were not
given their due importance in spite of
their existence in the 1970s. 
More over, these conflicts must have
been seen as a price to be paid for
enhancing production at a time when
efficient technology was seen as the
principal weapon for alleviating pover-
ty. The perception of conflicts as aris-
ing from a clash between
incompatible technologies gained
ground only when these conflicts
erupted into violence in some of the
Southeast Asian countries like
Malaysia and Indonesia.
Conflicts as they are addressed in
the Philippines like in many other
marine contexts have essentially got
to do with the co-existence of incom-
patible technologies in an environ-
ment of growing population pressure
on a shrinking resource base. This is
further aggravated by degradation of
the coastal zone by pollution, destruc-
tive fishing prac-tices, destruction of
mangrove forests and coral reefs. In
a worsening resource environment it
is quit logical that the relatively more
efficient technology in use will be at-
tacked.
Like in many other countries, the
important trawling grounds are also
the fishing grounds where traditional
small-scale fishermen fish. For exam-
ple, Manila Bay, San Miguel Bay
Visayas, Leyte, Samar etc. are also
areas where there is a large concen-
tration of municipal fishermen.
What is quite special about
technology-based conflicts in the
Philippines is that unlike Malaysia or
Indonesia the incidence of open, con-
flicts with trawlers is insignificant, in
spite of a long history of struggle from
the 1970s. The structure of conflicts
is slowly changing. As a result of
depletion of trawlable resources in the
coastal waters, the trawlers are mov-
ing out in search of other species.
There is relatively much less talk and
concern expressed about trawling in
the municipal waters now. This was
confirmed by the fishermen I talked
to at a national convention in
Batangas City, organized by Asian
Social Institute in December 1988.
According to the fishermen, the main
reason for trawlers moving out of
municipal waters is dissipation of pro-
fit. The national regulations were least
responsible for this phenomenon.
According to some, the techno-
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logy-based conflicts now are between
(i) basnig operators and small
fishermen and (ii) purse-seine
operators and fish aggregating
devices’ (FAD) operators. After much
prodding, all fishermen, however, ad-
mitted that the problem with the ut-
most severity is destructive fishing
practices by municipal fishermen
themselves using dynamite (blast
fishing) and cyanide (for drugging
fish). Concern was also expressed
against muro-ami fishing, a method
introduced by Japanese to catch cor-
al fish.
Though the magnitude of damage
done by blast fishing and cyanide
poisoning was obvious, the percep-
tion of this magnitude in terms of the
actual situation was not so evident as
the concern against trawling. In other
words, even when a fisherman ar-
ticulates the hierarchy of problems af-
fecting his fishery and fishing ground,
there is a refraction of the actual
situation conditioned by his preferen-
tial use of information rather than by
the actual situation. This information
is mostly derived from outside
sources mainly social activists. Or
perhaps it is more convenient to
blame trawling because of his low
participation in this kind of fishing.
Whereas, in destructive fishing prac-
tices almost all the small-fishermen
are involved.
This attitude of fishermen speaks
eloquently about the inherent limita-
tions of any fishery management
system. Certain practices like blast
fishing and cyanide poisoning though
they meet with disapproval at the
state level, do not meet with social
disapproval at the local level. The
local community will not hold an act
of this kind against its interests. In
other words, these practices, or, for
that matter, the use of fine mesh nets
do not violate the professional ethics
or the behavioural norms of the local
community. At the same time, pro-
blems caused by trawling seem to
evoke the entire support of the village
in admonishing it, irrespective of the
relatively smaller damage caused to
the resource and the fishing ground
by trawling vis a vis destructive fishing
methods. The admonition is more so
when it is a commercial trawler and
not a ‘baby’ trawler (below 3 GT).
Though fishermen have been
demanding a blanket ban on trawling
we have not yet come across any
study on whether or not any serious
differences in attitude towards com-
mercial and baby trawlers exists. Are
the villagers soft on baby trawlers
operating from the locality in the
traditional fishing ground as against
the port-based commercial trawlers
violating their communal waters? If
perceptible differences occur, to what
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extent are they related to the power
structure within the barangay or
municipality controlling the trading
outlets? Is the suki relationship — a
patron-client relationship covering all
the economic transactions of
fishermen — in any way muffling the
real voice of subsistence fishermen?
From the municipalities I visited in
Lamon Bay these questions could not
be answered because of absence of
trawler owners in the area. Never-
theless, from hearsay evidence it can
be said that there is a difference in
attitude towards commercial vessels
and municipal trawlers within a
municipality. Therefore, one wonders
whether the movement against com-
mercial trawlers is manipulated by the
local elite who want to ensure trawl-
ing rights for their own fleet. This they
do by exploiting the sentiments of
subsistence fisherfolk about resource-
depletion and habitat destruction.
This has to be looked into in more
detail.
The organisations working among
fishermen (which are by and large
organised from above), perhaps as a
tactical step, seem to be avoiding any
threat to the established order. In a
situation where the credibility of the
executive and the judiciary is low,
such an approach has only led to law-
making (as a ritual) without any effort
at enforcement. It remains a war of
words without any scope for correc-
tive measures being taken to
salavage a deteriorating situation.
History of fishing legislation
in the Philippines
The Philippines has a history of
fishing legislation dating back to
1932. The distinction between
‘municipal’ and ‘commercial’ fisheries
was made this year mainly with the
purpose of licensing and taxing
vessels in the commercial class
(Spoehr, A. op. cit.). Jurisdiction of
waters upto three nautical miles (5.5
km) from the coastline was granted
to the municipality in the same year
according to Commonwealth Act
No.4003 (Smith. I.R. et al 1983).
After the introduction of trawling
and its subsequent emergence as the
dominant fishing gear for catching
demersal species, many kinds of
legislation were passed at sporadic
intervals with the idea of protecting
resources from over- exploitation.
Regulations were also made to pre-
vent the use of explosives and
poisonous substances in fishing
operations.
The thrust of the early legislation
on conservation of resources and
generation of revenue was maintain-
ed when a comprehensive fisheries
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policy was formulated and introduc-
ed in the form of Presidential Decree
No. 704 in 1975. A major shift from
this tradition was observed only
recently when the new Philippines
constitution, ratified on 2 Feb 1987,
talks about supporting and protecting
the interests of subsistence
fishermen.
According to the Constitution, Ar-
ticle XIII, Section 7: 
«The State shall protect the rights of
subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential
use of the communal marine and fish
resources, both inland and offshore. It
shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate
financial, production and marketing
assistance and other services. The
state shall also protect, develop and
conserve such resources. The protec-
tion shall extend to offshore fishing
grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers
shall receive a just share from their
labour in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.»
The Philippines is perhaps the on-
ly country where the rights of the sub-
sistence fishermen to the preferential
use of fish resources are guaranteed
by the constitution.
However, the provisions of this ar-
ticle have not yet been implemented.
The bills are still in the process of
legislation, i.e., two years after
ratification of the new constitution.
The operational aspects of fishing
and fisheries are regulated according
to the Presidential Decree 704 and its
various amendments even now.
The presidential Decree No. 704
was passed with the idea of con-
solidating all laws and decrees affec-
ting fishing and fisheries. The main
focus of the Decree was the revitaliza-
tion of the production structure to in-
crease supply to the domestic
market; to achieve import substitution
of fish and fishery products through
wise utilization, proper conservation
and integrated development.
According to this Decree, a
licence, lease agreement or permit
was made compulsory for all fishing
vessels. Commercial fishing vessels
about 3 GT and above are prohibited
from operating in waters below 7
fathoms, ostensibly to ensure the
rights of municipal fishermen (this is
not spelt out in the Decree). The baby
trawlers using fishing boats of 3GT or
less, are however, allowed to operate
in waters beyond 4 fathoms from the
coast provided they are authorised to
do so by existing  municipal or-
dinances.  Thus, by inference, trawl-
ing is completely prohibited up to 4
fathoms depth zone. However,
through a subsequent amendment,
P.D.No.1015 in 1976 provision was
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made for banning trawling operations
within a distance of 7 kilometers (3.78
nautical miles) from the shore line, if
public interest so requires’, thus pass-
ing an apparent reference to existing
conflicts. For banning, the recom-
mendation had to come from the
Secretary of Fisheries (replaced by a
Minister now).
According to the Decree No. 1015,
Letter of Instruction No.480 was
issued in the same year prohibiting
trawling and purse-seining (commer-
cial) within a distance of 7 kilometers
from the shorelines of the provinces
of Northern Leyte, Southern Leyte,
Northern Samar, Eastern Samar,
Western Samar and Sorsogon.
Subsequently, through a letter of
Instruction No.1328 in 1983 the Presi-
dent of the Philippines prohibited
commercial trawling and purse-
seining (i.e. boats above 3 GT) within
a marine area of 7 kilometers from the
shoreline of all provinces of the Philip-
pines. This letter of Instruction ex-
plicitly states as its objective, the
urgency «to improve the standard of
living in the rural fishing com-
munities», to protect municipal
fishery resources against the heavy
exploitation of fish and aquatic
resources on the entire marine water
areas…, to provide municipal and
small-scale fishermen a wider area
within which to operate the fishing
boats of three gross tonnes or less
and to increase their catch per unit
effort» (PLOI No.1328).
Thus, at the national level, restric-
tions on commercial vessels were in
three stages.
Firstly, commercial operations
within 7 fathoms depth zone from the
shore were prohibited. Among the
municipal fishing craft, restrictions
were placed on baby trawlers in the
sense that they could operate only in
waters beyond 4 fathoms, provided
municipal ordinances permitted it
(otherwise, they also had to operate
beyond 7 fathoms). Secondly, com-
mercial fishing activities, specifically
trawling and purse-seining were pro-
hibited in selected areas within 7
kilometers from the coast line and,
thirdly, operation of commercial trawl-
ing and purse-sening were banned
within 7 kilometers all over the pro-
vinces of the Philippines.
The penalty for violation of clos-
ed areas, however, is quite nominal
and it is clearly spelt out only for viola-
tions by trawlers. The penalty, as
mentioned in P. D. 704 of 1975 is: ‘a
fine of not less than 1000 pesos (US
$ 50) or imprisonment for a period of
not exceeding one year, or both fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court’. The task of enforcement is
entrusted with Bureau of Fisheries
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and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated
National Police and Philippine
Coastguard ‘through close coopera-
tion and systematic coordination of
the personnel under their respective
supervision’ (Memorandum of Agree-
ment on the Joint Implementation and
Enforcement of All Fishery Laws,
Decrees, Proclama-tions, Memoran-
dum Circulars, General Orders, Let-
ters of Instruc-tions and All Rules and
Regulations promulgated thereunder,
1976).
Penalty for violation of closed
areas within the municipal jurisdiction
of 3 nautical miles from the shoreline
is, however, vested with the municipal
governments. The penalty would vary
from municipality to municipality ac-
cording to the provision made in the
municipal ordinances.
Among the violations, the one at-
tracting the heaviest punishment ac-
cording to P.D.704, is gathering fish
with the aid of explosives and obnox-
ious or poisonous substances or by
the use of electricity. The penalty was
originally 10 to 12 years if explosives
were used, 12 to 20 years if injury to
any person was caused and 20 years
to life imprisonment or death in the
case of loss of life. It was further in-
creased through a Presidential
Decree No. 1058 in 1976. According
to this Decree mere possession of ex-
plosive with intention for illegal fishing
could bring a penalty of imprisonment
from 12 to 25 years and if the ex-
plosive is actually used it could be 25
years to life imprisonment. If the use
of explosives resulted in loss of
human life the penalty is life imprison-
ment to death.
The strong punitive measures
perhaps reveal the widespread use of
explosives in the Philippine ar-
chipelago. According to a position
paper prepared by Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) on use of dynamite, other ex-
plosives and poisonous substances
about 60 percent of the coral reefs of
the Philippines have been destroyed
by these illegal fishing methods
(BFAR 1988).
Thus, we can see that the impor-
tant problems faced by the Philippine
fisheries are addressed in the legisla-
tion process. But to what extent have
these regulations been successfully
implemented?
Enforcement of fishing
legislation 
In order to get a clear idea about
the process of enforcement I had
discussions with the Director of En-
forcement, Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, Commander  of
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Philippines Coastguard, Mayors of
three municipalities and the police
belonging to Philippine Constabulary
in the Lamon Bay.
Another important aspect in the
implementation of law is its
awareness among the fisherfolk.
Regarding this I had discussions with
fishermen at a National Convention
of Small Fishermen, Batangas city,
community organizers of the Asian
Social Institute, and leaders of
Pamalakaya, an organization of small
fishermen and peasants.
The enforcement is at two levels.
As I mentioned earlier, BFAR,
Coastguards and Philippine Con-
stabulary/Integrated National Police
together are supposed to implement
the law in all instances except in
cases of transgression of commercial
vessels into municipal waters. This is
left to the municipal council to im-
plement.
In spite of the ‘Memorandum of
Agreement’ between various agen-
cies entrusted with the task of im-
plementing and enforcing provisions
of Presidential Decrees which clear-
ly spell out the role of respective
agencies, the enforcement machinery
is a gross failure in the Philippines.
Though five specific offences viz.
(i) illegal fishing (ii) fishing with fine
mesh nets (iii) trawl fishing in waters
seven fathoms deep or less (iv) ban
on exportation of bangu fry and (v)
pollution of waters are mentioned in
P.D.704, the only offence on which
some action is taken is illegal fishing.
As far as violation of the 7 km-ban is
concerned, not a single case has
been charged so far in the Philip-
pines. In other words, section 35 of
P.D.705, its subsequent amendments
in P.D. No.1015, Letters of Instruc-
tions Nos. 480 and 1328 are not im-
plemented at all. This was admitted
by Commander Quevas of Coast
guard and Mr. Gamilla, Director of
Enforcement, BFAR.
Though the concerned depart-
ments are supposed to send a bi-
monthly report ‘pinpointing the areas
where illegal fishing is rampant and
containing a list of persons ap-
prehended for having violated the
fishery laws, decrees, rules and
regulations’ (Memorandum of Agree-
ment, 1976), these reports mention
only apprehensions of illegal fishing
activities. A Fisheries Administrative
Order No.156 was further issued in
1986 specifically on the implementa-
tion of L.I.1328 prohibiting the opera-
tion of com-mercial purse-seine and
trawl operations within 7 km, and it
insisted on a monthly report from the
imple-menting agencies on their ac-
complishments. This order also is not
complied with.
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In spite of the ‘Memorandum of
Agreement’ it is quite clear that there
is no effective co-ordination between
the various agencies concerned. This
was evident from the manner BFAR
and the Coastguard expressed their
misgivings about each other. Accor-
ding to Commander Quevas, BFAR
is not really serious about implemen-
tation of various provisions. A similar
view was also expressed by the
Philippine Constabulary which mans
the police stations in Perez Island.
Though the ‘Memorandum’ was
drawn up there was no effort on the
part of the government to strengthen
the implementing machinery to
undertake its task effectively. Thus,
in real terms, precious little is done
by the government to ensure the ef-
ficacy of legislation though sufficient
number of «paper tigers» were
created.
Reasons for poor
enforcement 
Commander Quevas briefed the
practical difficulties they face. The
Coastguard is to protect the interests
of twenty departments, mostly
mutually exclusive ones. Considering
the vast waters of the Philippines and
its archipelagic character, he said it is
physically impossible to do a
satisfactory job for all these depart-
ments. Moreover, among the duties
they perform, the lowest priority is
given to enforcement of fishing
regulations. And among the regula-
tions the one with the lowest priority
is implementation of the seven km
ban! In fact, not a single case has
been charged by the Coastguard in
this respect. Similarly, BFAR has also
not charged a single violation of this
prohibition. Regarding their inability
to enforce fisheries laws BFAR has a
host of reasons to give. These
reasons are expressed, however, in
the context of difficulty in apprehen-
ding violations under section 33 which
deal with illegal fishing (meaning,
mainly fishing with dynamite and
cyanide) nevertheless, they can be
valid in the enforcement of other
regulations also.
To quote from their position paper
on illegal fishing:
«To be strict in the implementation of
fishery laws is quite difficult because
of possible retaliatory actions from
violators and lawless elements. »
The enforcement officers are
sometimes harassed, relieved of their
duties and transferred to inconvenient
places as a result of political in-
terference.
The institutional problems spelt
out by the paper are:
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«(a) Lack of support and sufficient
resources exemplified by the absence
of/or lack of operation/effectively
functioning equipments of facilities
which include the lack of firearms pro-
vided for active law enforcement, for
personal defence or protection pur-
poses against the violators/enemies 
(b)…(because of) existing low pay or
funding support, despite the risk and
danger in their assigned duties, law
enforcement personnel could easily
succumb to temptations which are
simply graft and corruption.»
Lack of support from the judiciary
is another factor mentioned in the
paper, which was also corroborated
by the municipal authorities and the
Coastguard.
Lastly and most importantly, there
are no safeguards and support ex-
tended to law enforcement officers
against harassment and counter-
charges (on technical grounds). In
such a situation, the mother agencies
do not provide them with legal
counsels or financial support. There
are cases where the law enforcement
officers get suspended. This functions
as a clear disincentive to law en-
forcers in booking violators.
The local municipal governments
are also quite lax in implementing the
laws. Their approach is quite different
from that of the national government.
They would rather prefer to settle the
violations/disputes informally at the
municipal level itself. One of the
reasons for this approach is the non
co-operation from BFAR and the lack
of credibility of the judicial machinery.
And secondly, because of various in-
surgent movements in the Philippines
they do not want to offend the
violators fearing a reprisal later.
Therefore, they opt for an amicable
settlement by requesting the violators
to pay a small amount (which is nor-
mally less than half the fine specified
in the P.D.704) as compensation.
Here again the municipal government
takes cognizance of the violation on-
ly if the fishermen bring it to their
notice.
In the municipalities of Perez,
Alabat and Quezon Quezon that I
visited, the main problems were
dynamiting of fish, cyanide-poisoning
of coral fish, encroachment of basnigs
into the waters around traditional Fish
Aggregating Devices (boya fishing)
using powerful lights at night and the
use of fine-mesh nets (called hulbot
or buli buli, a variant of trawl-net in-
troduced only three years ago).
In Perez during October-
December about twenty buli buli
operators were apprehended
because of encroachment into
municipal waters but they were not
formally charged. They were allowed
to go on payment of a nominal fine
to the municipality. The approach of
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the municipality would differ accor-
ding to the nature of the violator. For
example, if a citizen of the municipali-
ty is apprehended for illegal fishing
using dynamite, a case will be formal-
ly charged and forwarded to the court
whereas if the violator is a ‘stranger’
from a different island the issue is
amicably settled.
The scenario in the other two
municipalities I visited was different
from Perez. In Alabat the P.D.704 of
1975 was ratified only in 1987! The
7 km ban is not yet ratified by the
municipality. Even illegal fishing is not
referred to the court because of ap-
parent non co-operation of the BFAR
and lack of credibility of the judiciary.
Though there are seasonal encroach-
ment (during Jan-Aug) into municipal
waters by trawlers from Manila,
Cavite, Lucina provinces no action is
taken against them mainly out of fear.
The trawlers are supposed to be arm-
ed to the teeth! Even municipal
fishermen are afraid of these en-
croachers. As far as violations within
the municipality are concerned, the
mayors of Alabast and Quezon
Quezon are more tactical because of
political reasons. The political out-
come of the election is quite depen-
dent of the fishermen and if the
mayor strictly implements the law
against illegal fishing and use of fine-
mesh nets, the majority of fishermen
will have to be booked! In these
municipalities with coral reefs and
mangrove forests, dynamiting is an
important method for catching fish
and the mayor would not like to risk
his political future for the sake of im-
plementing fisheries regulations.
According to the organizers of
Asian Social Institute, these are the
municipalities where there is some
semblance of implementation. If the
situation is like this here, one can ima-
gine what it would be like in other
municipalities. Thus, at the national
and local level the enforcement
machinery is grossly inadequate and
incapable of implementing the regula-
tions, exposing the total fallacy of
presidential decrees.
Even after the change of govern-
ment and the ratification of a new
constitution there is no discernible in-
terest shown by the government in
qualitatively improv-ing the situation
prevailing on the enforcement front.
A classic example of lack of
political will on the part of the govern-
ment was quite evident in the case of
San Miguel Bay as demonstrated by
the ICLARM study (Smith et al 1983).
According to the existing rules which
disallow trawling within 4 fathom
isobath, 55 percent of the Bay is in-
accessible to trawling. In 30 percent
of the Bay’s surface area trawlers
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below 3 GT could be permitted and
only in 15 percent of the Bay can
trawlers above 3 GT fish. In the Bay
area only two out of the total twelve
municipalities have passed resolu-
tions legalizing trawling within 4 to 7
fathoms. However, in these particular
municipalities the 4 fathom mark is
beyond the municipal boundary
(which is 3 nautical miles), thus mak-
ing these ordinances superfluous.
Therefore, in this Bay vessels below
3 GT can fish only in areas above 7
fathom isobath and this means only
15 percent of the waters are legally
accessible to trawling! However,
small trawlers indulged in in-
discriminate trawling all over the Bay
irrespective of this According to
Smith, I, et al
«…if only existing legislation were en-
forced, the problems of competition
and conflict between small-scale and
trawl gear could be avoided. Certain-
ly, confinement of small trawlers to that
15 percent area of the Bay (San
Miguel) where they can legally operate
would do much to shift the distribution
of catch and incomes from the large-
scale trawl fishery in favour of the non-
trawl fishery». (Smith et al. ibid.).
Awareness of legislation
among fishermen
Regarding the awareness of
various provisions of presidential
decrees among the non-trawl
municipal fishermen, it was quite
shocking to notice that most of them
(in Perez, Alabat & Quezon Quezon)
became aware of these provisions on-
ly in 1987-88 as a result of the interac-
tion with the community organizers of
ASI, i.e., about five to twelve years
after the decrees/letters of instruc-
tions were promulgated. Mr. Santos,
Head of the Legal Division, dealing
with municipal fisheries admitted that
there were no mass-contact program-
mes organised by BFAR to
disseminate the content of various
decrees and LOI among fishermen.
Destructive fishing
practices 
The impression I got from the
fishermen at the national convention
and in the municipalities I visited is
that the encroachment of trawlers into
prohibited waters is decreasing over
time. The reason given by the
fishermen is that the municipal waters
are not rich fishing grounds any more
for trawlers. They are, therefore, mov-
ing into deep waters or using other
gear. Some of the fishermen were
very critical of destructive fishing us-
ing dynamite and cyanide. According
to them, it is the problem which has
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the gravest consequences for
resources. But at the same time there
is no disapproval of the practice at the
local level. The fishermen from Tawi
Tawi, the southern most islands in the
Philippine archipelago, e.g., even
defended dynamiting claiming that in
spite of using dynamite as the prin-
cipal fishing method from the 1940s
there is no depletion of resources in
their waters.
The practice of dynamiting/
cyanide poisoning or fish seems to be
concomitant with farming activities.
But this is largely a coral reef-specific
activity. Two reasons are mainly at-
tributed by fishermen for the use of
dynamite. Firstly, it is cost-efficient:
the cost of one day’s operation is on-
ly equivalent to one US dollar.
Secondly, it saves a lot of time, (little
time need to be spent in preparing
and repairing gear before and after
the operation!). The second reason
is particularly important because it
facilitates fishing on a day they have
to undertake farming activities.
Destructive fishing practices, ir-
respective of the severe penalties
which can go upto death sentence,
are rampant all over the Philippines
and, ironically, the main source of
dynamite is the Army itself, followed
by mining companies! Cyanide
fishing is used for catching ornamen-
tal fish for aquaria and cyanide is sup-
plied by agents of ornamental fish
dealers in Hong Kong. The
preference of part-time fishermen for
destructive fishing practices have to
be looked into in more detail,
especially in archipelagic waters. This
phenomenon was also observed in In-
donesian archipelago.
It is also interesting to observe
that farmer/agricultural labourer
fishermen are also less militant com-
pared to full-time fishermen. Even if
the trawlers are violating prohibitions
in municipal waters, right in front of
their eyes, they do not, out of fear, try
to mobilize the enforcement authori-
ty to apprehend the violators. The
commercial fishermen are feared to
be armed or members of the outlaw-
ed National People’s Army (NPA).
Conclusion
The tensions between trawlers
and traditional gear-groups are of
relatively recent origin in the Philip-
pines. Various regulatory measures
had been taken, mainly with the pur-
pose of conservation of resources
and, until 1983 there was no mention
of the conflicts in the municipal
Waters.
As the situation is today, trawling
is prohibited in waters below 7
fathoms isobath and trawlers and
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purse-seiners above 3 GT are bann-
ed all over the Philippines in waters
beyond 7 km from the shoreline. Ac-
cording to the new constitution, rights
of the subsistence fishermen to the
preferential use of fishery resources
are also guaranteed, however little is
done to ensure these rights to sub-
sistence fishermen.
Social and political factors seem
to determine the nature of articulation
of protest. There seems to exist dif-
ference in attitude towards trawlers
locally based and those coming from
outside. This is influenced by the ex-
tent of integration of subsistence
fishermen into the local power-
structure. At the same time, the
prevailing political atmosphere —
resulting from insurgencies — also in-
fluences the nature of protest.
As in Malaysia, in spite of poor en-
forcement there is less tension in the
1980s. The fishermen attribute this to
a decrease in frequency of transgres-
sions into municipal waters. More
than the efficacy of enforcement, this
is because of resource depletion for-
cing commercial trawlers into deeper
waters.
Nevertheless, tensions between
fish aggregating device operators and
purse-seine fishermen are severe.
Destructive fishing practices are still
continuing unabated. This is perhaps
the worst problem affecting the
Philippine fisheries.
However, the enforcement scene
is very dismal. The awareness of
various regulations also seem to be
poor among the municipal fishermen.
The Philippines is a sad case of
total lack of legitimacy for the
legislative process, the enforcement
authority and the judiciary. In this con-
test the decrees only become alibi for
providing a semblance of equity.
Moreover, the regulations/decrees do
not take into consideration the
geographical variations according to
resource availability, organization and
means of production, complexity of
fishing ground etc.
In a situation like this it is impossi-
ble to have any meaningful im-
plementation unless alternative
means are used. At a Conference on
Environmental Law Education and
Practice, organized by the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of
National Resources on 15 December
1988, in Manila, the inadequacy of the
judicial system was discussed. It was
observed that law cannot be above
the dominant interests of society. One
of the participants suggested per-
suasive tactics outside the judicial
system (which according to him is
«unfair, corrupt sand unreliable») for
settle-ment of disputes, thus advo-
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cating promotion of arbitration without
involving the judiciary.
Even if arbitration is carried out
outside the ambit of judiciary, it is
highly unlikely that the poor fishermen
will be able to receive justice because
of the inequality inbuilt into the Philip-
pine society as a whole. Even if extra-
judicial methods are resorted to, it is
likely that these methods will also be
appropriated by the ‘better-offs’ in the
respective communities. Unless the
opportunity cost of labour increases
the situation in the fishing sector is dif-
ficult to change for the better.
In this situation unless the social
condition of production and organisa-
tion change, legislation process will
not have much relevance. But this
transformation has to be aided by
both intra and inter-sectoral factors.
Thus, for example, there could, on the
one hand, be a seaward expansion
of the fishing grounds towards untap-
ped areas and, on the other, there
should be inter-sectoral mobility of
labour leading to reduced pressure
on the municipal waters. Generally
speaking, only in a situation of im-
provement in economic conditions
will an atmosphere for the efficacy of
legislation develop. Otherwise, it
should be a case where the national
economy is capable of subsidising
particular groups of fishermen
because of growth in other sectors.
(like in Norway, for example). In other
words, the most meaningful resolu-
tion of conflicts within the fisheries
sector really lies outside, not within.
New draft bills
under discussion
After the ratification of the new
constitution which lays special em-
phasis on the rights of subsistence
fishermen, there has been a rethink-
ing in political circles regarding the
adequacy of P.D.704 in resolving pro-
blems of small fishermen. As a result,
a new bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives on the 18th
May 1988 (House Bill No.9580) ‘to
promote... distributive justice and
achieve genuine national economic
development’ with priority to sub-
sistence fishermen and special em-
phasis on resource conservation. The
bill envisages the setting up of
Resource Management Councils at
the municipal, provincial and national
levels to manage communal waters
(defined as waters within 25 fathom
isobath from the shoreline), coastal
waters (waters beyond the seaward
boundary of communal waters to a
distance of 30 nautical miles) and off-
shore water (waters beyond the
coastal waters). The demarcation of
the sea into three areas is also gear-
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specific. Within the communal waters,
only passive gear (including hook
and line, fish pens / traps, gill-nets etc)
are  allowed  and in the other two
demarcated fisheries both active and
passive gear can be used. Similarly,
within the communal waters only
vessels below 3 GT can be used.  And
in all the three fisheries only Filipinos
can operate, thus precluding any
foreign collaboration.
The users of communal waters
are supposed to be subsistence
fishermen who are directly involved
in fishing activity (but do not under-
take operation without active par-
ticipation) with or without the
assistance of fishworkers (defined as
those who are employed by an
operator or   a fisherman). And the
users of coastal and offshore waters
according to the draft law will be
fishery operators (defined as those
who own and provide the means to
engage in fisheries) registered with
and licensed by the provincial govern-
ment (for coastal areas) and with the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) (for offshore
waters). They should have a
minimum experience of three to five
years in the respective fisheries.
The draft bill aims at devolution of
power to the RMCs for the Manage-
ment and control of the Philippine
waters and fishery resources. It also
makes provisions for arbitrating
disputes at the coastal, provincial and
national levels through the RMCs
thus minimizing the dependence on
the judicial machinery.
If implemented, this will be a
radical measure for managing the
fisheries sector with minimum in-
volvement of the government
machinery. According to a senior of-
ficial in the BFAR, this is far too
radical and therefore they have sub-
mitted another bill to remove the
‘revolutionary’ content of House Bill
9580. This Draft Bill (No.18422), sub-
mitted by BFAR, is very similar to the
P.D.704 in essence except for the
declaration of policy objectives and
the definition of municipal waters.
SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1
74
FISHING LEGISLATION IN ASIA
75
With a coastline of 2614 kmsThailand accounted for 2
million tonnes of marine catch in the
year 1986 — the highest in the
Southeast Asian region. About 70
percent of the total catch is trash and
under-sized fish and is converted in-
to fishmeal which accounts for the
highest volume of marine products
exports from Thailand.
The marine fisheries sector is
largely export-oriented with over 70
percent of production moving into
fishmeal, canning and frozen food in-
dustries (in the order of importance).
In 1987 Thailand earned an estimated
US$ 1.2 billion from her fish exports,
out-earning rice, the country’s one-
time top export (Teresa Sofia, 1988).
Export earnings from marine products
accounted for 11 percent of the total
export earnings of the country.
(SEAFDEC 1988).
The fisheries sector contributed to
1.6 percent of the country’s GDP and
accounted for 9 percent of agricultural
GDP in 1986 (ibid.). Fishery products
constitute an important source of pro-
tein for the Thai people. The per-
capita consumption of fish is approxi-
mately 22.5 kg.
According to the latest Marine
Fishery Census (1985) there are
about 140,000 fishermen and 60,000
fishery establishments in Thailand.
About 8,000 fishermen are in the sub-
sistence sector, 100,000 in the small-
scale and 13,000 in the commercial
sector (1).
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(1) According to the National Statistical Office (NSO) all fishing establishments with powered vessels of and below 10
GT belong to the small-scale sector and all establishments without boats belong to the subsistence sector. All
establishments with inboard-powered vessels of 10 GT and above are large-scale operators. (Teresa Sofia. ibid.)
Fishery establishment ‘refers to an economic unit which was engaged in marine capture fishery/coastal aquaculture
during the past one year’ (1985 Marine Fishery Census of Thailand, NSO and Department of Fisheries, Ministry of
Agriculture and Co-ops 1987).
Nearly half of the total number of
fishermen are fully dependent on
fishing as the only source of income.
Of the three sectors mentioned
above, the largest share to the total
production is from the commercial
sector (almost ninety percent). The
contribution of the small-scale sector
is 8 percent and that of the sub-
sistence sector is negligible. Thus,
less than 10 percent of the total
number of fishermen account for 90
percent of production.
History and development
of Thai fisheries
Traditionally, fish is the most im-
portant source of protein for the Thai
population who are predominantly
hinayana Buddhists. ‘There is rice in
the fields, fish in the water’ is the way
people used to express their
livelihood (Insor, D. 1966) from time
immemorial. Until the early decades
of this century, this taste for fish was
largely confined to the rivers and
lakes of Thailand. Inland fisheries was
second only to agriculture as the main
occupation of the Thais. It was the
chief employer of coastwise popula-
tion and a large revenue earner for
the State (Smith, H.M. 1925). Access
to the fishery was not open and it
depended on the capacity of the in-
dividual to pay taxes which were
rather heavy (almost 7 percent of
the total value of production) (1).
Infrastructural facilities were good
for the market to absorb fresh fish. Ice
also was used in the 1920s for preser-
vation. As a result, large quantities of
fish moved within the domestic
market particularly from the head of
the Gulf of Siam by rail and steamer
to Bangkok. Inland fish resources
were subjected to a lot of stress
leading to overfishing and farmers
were forced to eat marine fish.
Although the contribution of the
marine sector was not significant in
the domestic market, there was a
broad-based group of gear. Most im-
portant among them was the bamboo
stake trap used in the estuaries. A
variety of seines and gill-nets was also
used in addition to troll-lines and set-
lines. The marine sector also catered
to the export market. Large quantities
of small fish were caught even then
and were used for feeding domestic
animals and fertilizing land (Smith,
H.M ibid.). The fishing units in the
marine sector were also subject to
taxation and this effectively took away
the «open access» status of fishery
in Thailand, enjoyed by almost all the
other countries of the world.
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The shortage on inland fish coupl-
ed with the development of infrastruc-
tural facilities must have triggered
interest in marine fisheries in a big-
ger way. Two new gear — the
Chinese purse-seine and Japanese
trawl — were introduced in 1925 and
1930. In 1960, on the eve of the in-
troduction of the otter-board-trawl
from West Germany, the total marine
production had already outstripped
the inland fish production by over 30
per cent. 
From 1961 onwards, as result of
the introduction of otter-board-
trawling from West Germany there
was a rapid expansion of fishing ef-
fort and investment by the commer-
cial sector. Many factors seem to
have contributed to the development
of commercial fishery in Thailand.
Firstly, the 1950s and 1960s were the
decades when Thailand experienced
an economic boom with capital being
injected into all sections of the
primary industry (Hinton, P. 1985).
The Government subsidised loans at
low interests which were available for
investors in the commercial sector
(Panayotou & Jetanovanich 1987).
Secondly, the demand-side fac-
tors were favourable to the develop-
ment of fisheries. With the increase
in per capita income in the West there
was a strong impetus to international
demand for marine products, par-
ticularly prawns and shrimps
(Sakiyama, T 1984.). The local urban
markets were also able to offer bet-
ter prices because of the increasing
purchasing power of the citizens con-
sequent upon the economic «boom».
And, thirdly, to exploit the market
potential there were immigrant
Chinese fishermen from Fukien,
Guangdong provinces and Hainan
Island of China who integrated opera-
tions of fishing (particularly trawling)
and marketing through kinship links
(Sakiyama ibid.). They were also
adept at maintaining good relation-
ships with institutional banking.
Since infrastructural facilities were
already being built into the economy,
the transition from a largely localized
industry into one organized on a na-
tional and international level was fairly
quick. What is significant about this
transition is that it did not result in any
discernible conflicts. Unlike in
neighbouring Malaysia where the in-
troduction of trawling was met with
immediate reaction from the tradi-
tional sector, there were no such con-
flicts in Thailand in the nascent stages
of the introduction of trawling.
As sakiyama observes:
«In Thailand relatively harmonious
religious and ethnic relationship have
been maintained between local and
immigrant Chinese fishermen, who
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have entered marine fishing with few
conflicts resulting between them and
local traditional fishermen, mostly
ethnic Thais and Malays».
(Sakiyama ibid)
The main reason for the absence
of conflicts seem to be related, first-
ly, to the lack of an organized tradi-
tional marine fishery and secondly, to
its diminutive size. The most impor-
tant gear in the marine sector, as we
have mentioned before, was the bam-
boo stake trap operated by lessees
who paid taxes to the government.
Since commercial operations were
contingent on one’s capacity to pay
tax, fisheries may not have been a
worthwhile occupation for the
marginal population to follow.
Secondly, the population-land ratio in
Thailand earlier was quite low. So
there was no pressure to move from
farming to fishing as the principal oc-
cupation. And thirdly, the develop-
ment of commercial marine fishery
coincided with an impressive growth
in the Thai economy. The 7 percent
growth in national income in the
1960s opened up avenues for
employment outside fishing. This is
an important difference between
Thailand and other Southeast Asian
countries during the initial stages of
the introduction of trawling.
The above factors do not imply
that there were only a few households
catching fish from the sea. As
Nagalaksana points out.
«Almost without exception, every adult
rural inhabitant regardless of sex
knows by life-time experience how to
catch fish». (Nagalaksana, C. 1987).
For a large proportion of the
coastal population, particularly in
north Thailand, fishing perhaps was
a supplementary activity to rice far-
ming and horticulture, and met con-
sumption requirements rather than
being directed towards the market.
Large tracts of mangroves and in-
dented coastline must have facilitated
easy access to fish.
The situation in south Thailand
seems to have been different. Accor-
ding to some of my informants, in the
south there are a large number of
fishermen eking out subsistence from
fishing. Most of these fishermen are
descendants of immigrant Malay
fishermen. They share the concern
for resources expressed by their
counterparts in Malaysia and resent
trawling technology (Sakiyama, ibid.)
(1) According to Sakiyama (ibid.).
most fishermen on the east coast of
south Thailand are engaged in gill-
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netting or purse seining using craft
of the size 1-5 GT. According to
Thomas (1975) as reported in Hinton
(1985), violent clashes took place bet-
ween coastal villagers and crews of
large fishing vessels in south Thailand
in the early 1970s.
There seems to be a difference
in perception of the trawling problem
between the north and the south. This
seems to be related to the degree of
dependence on fishing as the prin-
cipal source of livelihood. The nor-
therners are perhaps less dependent
on fishing compared to the
southerners. Or is it that communal
factors account for this difference in
perception — that Buddhists are
more tolerant of ‘injustice’ than there
Muslim counterparts? The regional
differences in perception, regarding
commercialisation of fisheries and
factors responsible for it will make an
interesting study.
There is only very rudimentary
evidence on the existence of conflicts
between commercial and small
fishermen in the northern waters of
the Gulf of Thailand. (1) The nature of
the conflict itself, particularly of
trawlers with operators of traditional
gear is not properly discussed
anywhere. The problem is also made
difficult by the definition of the small-
scale sector. The definition of the
small-scale sector according to Na-
tional Statistical Office (NSO) (See
footnote 1 - p. 75) is different from that
of the Department of Fisheries, which
has a gear-based definition (2). These
definitions do not seem to do justice
to the perception of ‘conflicts’ as ar-
ticulated by the fishermen. Thus, for
example, according to a fisherman of
Trat (who is also a community
organizer), the major conflict in their
waters is actually between ‘small’ and
‘big’ trawlers, and the traditional
fishermen (operating gill-nets, crab-
nets, hook & line and squid traps)
support the ‘small’ trawlers. These
small-sized trawlers are from the
locality and there seems to be little
tension between the traditional
fishermen and these trawlers.
Within the locality the focus is
more on avoidance of conflicts bet-
ween trawlers and traditional gear.
Thus, e.g., as Teresa Sofia observes
from another part of the east coast,
the gill-net operators and the trawlers
in the locality operate at different
times to avoid conflicts (Teresa, S. op.
cit.). In these two areas the conflicts
seems to be determined by the village
ethos which seem to accommodate
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(1) Even in the south there is no literature for the situation in the 1980s.
(2)All gear excluding trawl, purse-seine, Spanish mackerel gill-net, mackerel encircling gill-net, bamboo stake-trap are
defined as small-scale gear. According to this definition, 80 per cent of total production is from the large-scale sector.
incompatible technologies provided
they are locally based. But the
factors determining the social
consent of these technologies have
to be studied.
However, in the fishing villages I
visited in Trat province there are con-
flicts within the traditional gear base:
between gill-nets and crab-nets; hook
& line and dynamite/ cyanide; squid
trap and crab-net/gill-net and finally
push-nets and oyster fishermen. In
the first type of conflicts, the gear gets
entangled leading to fights; in the se-
cond, hook & line fishermen are con-
cerned about the wanton destruction
of fish by dynamiting/ cyanide poison-
ing. In the third, traps get entangled
with the crab and gill-nets. Oyster
fishermen fight push-nets because of
indiscriminate killing of cockles.
These conflicts sometimes lead
to open fights but there is no resort to
judiciary for their resolution. The
conflicts are seen as part of the risk
they have to undertake while fishing.
Interestingly, almost all the fishermen
have a combination of these gear
(except dynamiting and cyanide
poisoning). Therefore, these conflicts
are purely circumstantial. There is no
division of labour according to gear.
But all these fishermen unite to fight
against granting ownership rights of
mangrove forests to individuals for
conversion into prawn culture ponds.
Conflicts involving trawlers are
largely inter-regional. Inter-gear
conflicts are circumstantial and
localised, i.e., within the traditional
users of the inshore waters. Incursion
of commercial interests into the
province, in the form of investment in
prawn culture, at the same time, is
strongly opposed.
History of fisheries
legislation
Thailand is one of the first coun-
tries in the world to introduce an Act
to manage its fishery. Thus, in 1864
the Water Duty Act was introduced
primarily with the objective of manag-
ing the inland waters. The Act divid-
ed the fishing grounds into a
sanctuary area and a reserved area
(Isvilanoda, S. et. al, in press). Fishing
was prohibited in the sanctuary area,
which was defined as the area close
to monasteries or places of worship.
Similarly, the law also prohibited
fishing during the spawning season
that coincides with the monsoon and
the use of toxic substances for killing
fish. The reserved area was that
designated for persons who paid du-
ty depending on the nature and the
area of the fishing ground and the
gear used. The Minister of Finance
had the authority to determine and
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collect the duties and the Minister of
Lands and Agriculture to look after
the conservation of fishery.
But as Dr. Smith points out,
«Those (regulations) that are strictly
protective or conservative, as
distinguished from those that pertain
to the imposing of taxes, the raising of
revenue,…, constitute an insignificant
part and are not very impressive ef-
fective or adequate…» (Smith, H.M.
op. cit.) (parenthesis added)
and,
«that Ministry (Lands and Agriculture)
has no powers or authority for the pro-
mulgation or enforcement of conser-
vancy and regulative measures» (ibid.)
(parenthesis added).
However, due credit should be
given to the fact that the need to con-
serve fishery resources was recogni-
sed by the Thais as early as the 1860s.
Dr. Smith, in his seminal review
of the fisheries situation in the
erstwhile Siam in the 1920s after stu-
dying the fishing practices and the
priorities of the government made an
impassionate plea for proper conser-
vation of fishing resources to cater
to the food requirements of the
population:
«There must be a thorough revision of
the entire body of fishery regulations
that are now in operation, and there
must be formulated new regulations,
applicable to the country at large and
drawn primarily with a view to the
preservation of the industry» (Smith,
H.M. ibid.).
Perhaps as a result of Dr. Smith
becoming the first Director of
Fisheries in Thailand, increased at-
tention was paid to conservation of
resources, particularly in the inland
waters in the 1930s.
The Fisheries Act of 1947
Although various fisheries tax
laws were enacted between 1901 and
1938, the first comprehensive
fisheries act was enacted only in
1947. Like in the case of previous
laws this Act also covered both inland
and marine fisheries. As Moore
observes:
«Having been drawn up in 1947 before
the development of marine fisheries,
the Act is drafted primarily with inland
fisheries in mind» (Moore, G.1978).
On an area basis the fisheries
sector was divided into four
categories. These were:
i) Preservation fisheries 
ii) Leasable fisheries
iii) Reserved fisheries and
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Preservation fisheries refer to
fishing grounds in the precincts of a
monastery or a place of worship
similar to the sanctuary area accor-
ding to the 1864 Water Duty Act.
Leasable fisheries are fishing
grounds leased out on the basis of an
auction for a period of one year, en-
suring exclusive right to the
designated area. However, sub-
sistence fishing was permitted in this
area.
Reserved fisheries are sites
licensed out on the basis of fixed
fee, according to the size of the sta-
tionary gear.
All waters excluding the three
mentioned above were public
fisheries.
The Act empowered the Minister
to issue notices regarding registration
of fishing gear and fishermen, licen-
sing of fishing implements (meaning
fishing gear) and specifica-tion of
fisheries tax for the operation of
licensed implements.
The Minister also had the power
to impose conservation controls like
mesh size regulation, closed season,
quota restriction, minimum size of
species and restriction on the nature
of the fishing implements.
The Act provided the legal basis
for the management of fisheries.
However, its main focus was on
revenue generation like in all the
previous fisheries tax law. It pro-
hibited the operation of stationary
gear in public waters. Access to
public waters was open but registra-
tion was mandatory.
Moore (op. cit.) finds this Act
anachronistic considering the fact
the Thailand has a multi-million dollar
industry based on marine fisheries.
He further opines,
«The changes in the law of the sea, the
adoption of a policy of limiting entry in-
to certain sectors of Thai fisheries, and
the negotiation of foreign fishing
agreements indicate a substantial
redirection of policies, policies which
it is suggested cannot be properly im-
plemented through the existing legisla-
tion». (Moore, ibid.).
Rather than any amendments to
the existing Act which «will serve on-
ly to pull further apart the fabric of a
law that was intended only as the
framework for the control of small
scale inland fisheries» (ibid.) he ad-
vocated a general revision of the Act
to serve as a basis for the manage-
ment and regulation of Thai fisheries.
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Fisheries Acts (No.2) 1953
& (No.3) 1985
Despite Moore’s recommenda-
tions, there were no attempts to
undertake a general revision of the
fisheries laws. There were two
amendments, the second being the
more important one. Even these
amendments did not take into con-
sideration the current requirements of
the fishery sector. The principal task
of these amendments particularly of
the Fisheries Act of 1985, was to
enhance the fines for violations rather
than to undertake a general revision.
From a careful reading of the
Fisheries Act of 1947 and its subse-
quent amendments in 1953 and 1985
it is evident that within its framework
it is possible to resolve many of the
management problems of the
fisheries. Even though there is ‘open
access’ to ‘public waters’ it is
regulated by various provisions of the
Act. Thus even in ‘public waters’
fishermen have to respect various
regulations pertaining to conserva-
tion, and without registration nobody
could enter any fishery. But none of
the provisions for conservation seem
to be evoked in any meaningful man-
ner so that the regulations can at least
function as a deterrent.
Under the aegis of these Acts
various regulatory schemes were
devised from 1952 onwards to con-
serve stocks of various groups of
species. Almost all these regulations
emphasized the need to control
fishing effort. Thus the Ministry of
Agriculture and Co-operatives
through a decree in 1972 proscribed
trawl and powered push-nets in
waters upto 3 km from the shore and
within 400m from other located
fishing gear. What is quite special
about the regulation on trawl gear is
that unlike in the Philippines,
Malaysia and Indonesia in the
Southeast Asian region the prohibi-
tion in Thailand is for protecting the
nursery and breeding grounds rather
than to resolve conflicts between
incompatible gear-groups (personal
discussion with Inspector General of
Fisheries, Thailand). On being
specifically asked whether small
fishermen have made any formal plea
for banning trawling, the officials of
the enforcement department and the
Inspector General of Fisheries replied
in the negative.
Reasons for poor
management
In spite of the fact that the govern-
ment was cognizant of the need for
conservation, the Gulf of Thailand has
been described as «potentially a
marine desert» (Sakiyama op. cit.) or
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an «underwater desert» (Bangkok
Bank, 1977, quoted in Hinton, P. op
cit.). The resource depletion and the
pre-ponderance of trash fish and
undersized fish underscore the failure
of the management schemes. This is
quite evident from the fact that only
0.2 percent of the total value of
marine catch is expended on enforce-
ment (from the Inspector General of
Fisheries, Bangkok). The vicious
circle of overcapitalization of the
fishery and over fishing along with the
clout of trawler fishermen, lack of
political will and the declaration of the
Exclusive Economic Zone by other
countries in the 1970s seem to have
aggravated the predicament of Thai
fisheries so much so that the lament
of Dr. Smith remains as valid today as
in 1925.
As we have mentioned in the
beginning, the Thai marine fishery is
basically an export-oriented one. It is
also designed to be operated in the
rich waters off the coasts of other
countries in the South China Sea and
the Indian Ocean. Before the
declaration of the EEZ in South and
Southeast Asian countries almost
one half of the total Thai trawl catches
was believed to have originated from
international waters. As a result of the
declaration of EEZ by the
neighbouring countries, Thailand lost
about 780,000 sq. km of distant water
fishing grounds (Panayotou &
Jetanovanich 1987) and was the
country most affected by the
declaration in this region. This led to
an intensification of fishing in their
territorial waters (Thailand was the
last country to declare its EEZ in the
Southeast Asian region, in 1981).
It is difficult to control the
expansion of fishing effort in the terri-
torial waters. Firstly, the rich fisher-
men are politically very powerful. The
Fishermen’s Co-operative Society
(FCS), Fishermen’s Group and the
Fishermen’s Associa-tion are con-
trolled, particularly by owners or skip-
pers of trawlers and/or purse-seiners.
Not only are they able to fish where
they wish but are also capable of
obtaining a steady supply of
reasonably priced fuel and scarce
credit (Sakiyama op. cit.).
In 1980 the government tried to
stop the registration of trawlers and
push-nets to control fishing effort but
the move was thwarted because the
Fishermen’s Association did not
agree with the proposed restrictions.
In 1983, because of resource deple-
tion, the government decided to close
the fishing ground in the Gulf around
Prachuab, Chumpon and Surat.
Trawling and purse-seining were
prohibited for a period of two months.
However, these fishermen refused to
accept the prohibition and the restric-
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tions had to be relaxed by the govern-
ment. Two factors are revealed by the
above examples. Firstly, the big
operators do not believe in the con-
servation of the fishery for regenera-
tion and Secondly, the government,
either because of a lack of political
will or the clout of trawler/purse-seine
operators was unable to implement
the management measures
(Isvilanoda et. al. op. cit).
Officials of the enforcement
department in a discussion with me
agreed that the enforcement of
fishing regulations is very sloppy.
However, they say, they are trying to
improve the efficacy of enforcement.
According to them there are basically
four difficulties. Firstly, the indented
nature of the coastline and size of the
fishing ground make enforcement
very difficult. Secondly, the villagers
by and large do not co-operate with
them in apprehending the violators.
Thirdly, there are budgetary and
personnel con-straints. And finally,
the judiciary does not cooperate with
the officials. Most of the violations
changed by the officials are
dismissed by the court.
The following list was provided
by the enforcement department on
the number of violations recorded
between 1986 and 1988.
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Considering the fact that there
are over 7,000 trawlers, 1,000  purse-
seiners and 1,500 push-nets it is dif-
ficult to believe that a more 0.03
percent of trawlers and purse-seiners
and 0.01 percent of push-net
Table I
Number of Prosecutions for the Violation of Fishery Regulations
(1986-1988)
Sl. Years Nature of violation
Gear
No. 1986 1987 1988
1. Pair trawling 10 11 43 Closed season and 3 km ban
2. Other trawling 10 20 31 -do-
3. Purse-seines 11 25 32 Closed season
4. Push-net 31 25 21 3 km ban
5. Bag-net 441 398 228 Not known
Source: Enforcement Section, Department of Fisheries, Bangkok.
operators violated regulations. The
higher incidence of apprehension
(10 percent) or bag-net operators is
perhaps because regulations on this
gear have been in operation since
the early-20th century.
What Teresa Sofia opines on
the basis of field work in Ao Cho in
Trat province reiterates the poor
enforcement of regulations:
«Perhaps the most important
problem with marine fisheries
policies in Thailand is not the lack of
measures of proposals, but the
enforcement of these measures»
(Teresa Sofia op. cit.)  
She further observes:
It is highly unlikely that the marine
police is able to effectively enforce
any of the measures mentioned,
there is simply not enough patrol
boats and personnel, there are
numerous security problems and
many officers (themselves local
people) sympathize with the
fishermen’s view point and turn a
blind eye over the matter» (ibid.).
Conclusion
Unlike in the other Southeast
Asian countries of our study, the
incidence of conflicts following the use
of incompatible technologies seems to
be low in Thailand. This is perhaps
related to the diminutive size of the
traditional sector and its weak political
clout, which stands in sharp contrast
with the power, and influence of the
trawler lobby in Thailand.
Because of economic and social
specificities, the trajectory of fisheries
development in Thailand was
different from other countries in the
region. The rapid industrialisation of
a modest fishery into one of the
largest in the world was achieved at
the cost of killing the ‘golden goose’
of rich fishing grounds. In spite of
legislation that is reasonably
sufficient to check this tendency very
little has been done.
In this context, an observation
made by Dr. Smith in 1925 still
makes sense:
«The history of fisheries and fishery
regulations everywhere has been
that fishermen and governments are
loathe to make even so small a
concession to the requirements of
nature, and the result is that we see
fisheries languishing and resources
gradually diminishing and
proceeding to the point of
commercial extinction, whereas,
with very little restriction on fishing
operations the same resources
might have been preserved
unimpaired for indefinite periods of
time» (Smith, H.M. op. cit.).
To use an analogy, what is hap-
pening in the Gulf of Thailand is akin
to slaughter tapping of rubber trees
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once their commercial life is over.
Lack of enforcement is the key factor
promoting over-exploitation. At the
same time, it is linked up with the
political milieu of the State and the
clout of the offenders. Irrespective of
the nature of destruction, if revenue is
forthcoming especially from exports,
the State has a tendency to swap
foreign exchange for long-term
sustenance of the fishery.
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Japan is the biggest producer andconsumer of fish in the world. In
1986 Japan harvested 12 million
tonnes of fish. The per capita
consumption of fish is approximately
70 kg accounting for one half of the
dietary supply of protein. But only 0.4
percent of the total population of 120
million is actively involved in fishing.
For the sake of fisheries
management, Japanese marine
fishery is divided into Coastal fishery,
Off-shore fishery and Distant-water
fishery. These sub-divisions are not
legally defined but there is an
operational distinction.
Coastal fishery refers to
operations (including mariculture)
within the 12-mile territorial waters
using powered vessels of less than
10 gross tones. These are mostly
family enterprise engaged in a
variety of single day operations.
Offshore fishery refers to opera-
tions beyond 12 miles using powered
vessels above 10 GT. Medium and
small enterprises are engaged in this
operation. The fishing trip may extend
from one day to a week.
Distant-water fishery is in
waters beyond the Japanese EEZ
and off those of various coastal
nations around the world.
About 80 percent of the labour
force comprises family members
engaged in coastal fisheries. The
remaining 20 percent is engaged in
distant-water and off-shore fisheries.
Although coastal fisheries account for
only 27.2 percent of the total produc-
tion, they account for 48 percent of
the total value which is the highest
contribution in terms of value among
all the three sub-sectors. This is be-
cause of the concentration on capture
and culture of high-value species.
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The focus of this chapter is
mainly on the historical evolution of
Japanese coastal fishery
management.
The feudal period
The traditional concepts of
fishing rights found their way into the
codified laws of the nation states
from the Tokugawa period in Japan
(1603 to 1867 AD). Village-based
fishing territories were established
and developed by the feudal lords
between 1560 and 1808. The sea
was regarded as an integral part of
the feudal domain and considered to
be an extension of the land.
The fishing rights were granted
ostensibly for two reasons. Firstly, for
Kako (corvee labour) and secondly,
for taxes. The foremost duties as
defined by the feudal fiefs were the
provision of Kako and payment of
taxes in cash and kind. Kako was
mainly for naval defence and guar-
ding the coast, transportation for the
rulers and for rescuing ships in
distress. There seems to be a third
reason for granting fishing rights to
the coastal villages viz. administra-
tive. Since the entire coastal waters
were apportioned among coastal
villages, it served the security in-
terests of the fiefs. The rights were
almost like an invisible fortification of
the sea and the fishermen did not
enjoy freedom of movement from
one village to another.
Thus it was a reciprocal arrange-
ment (though unequal in content)
between the feudal lords and the
fishermen. In return for the taxes and
services that the latter provided, they
were given fishing rights and trading
privileges. A salient feature of this
arrangement, which exists even
today in Japanese coastal fisheries, is
that the responsibility (for labour and
taxes) was delegated to the village
and not to individuals. Secondly,
relations between a village and the
outside world were regulated by the
authorities. But within the village,
matters were left to the villagers.
However, the formation of village-
based fishing territories was uneven
because of unequal development of
the market, varying geographical and
topographical circumstances and
differing produc-tive capacities of the
fisheries. By 1650s most exclusive
fishing terri-tories had been firmly
established.
The establishment of exclusive
fishing territories does not mean that
this is the only type of fishing rights.
«To make an otherwise rigid system
of exclusive territories, flexible and
workable» (Culland, A.1984), com-
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mon fishing territories were also
demarcated where fishermen from
more than one village could fish
subject to prescriptive and mutual
agreements. Thus there was a dual
system of exclusive and common
fishing territories which continue to be
so even now. As Culland remarks,
«the system of sea tenure was thus a
patchwork of criss-crossing rights that
had developed through prescriptive
and mutual agreements» (ibid.).
Within the exclusive-rights area
and the common fishing territory,
fishing operations were subject to a
licensing system which was largely
specific to the gear and the species.
The granting of licences in the case
of small-scale gear like gill-nets, set-
nets, drift-nets and traps was vested
with the village leadership. This
practice continues even today. The
only difference is that the village
leadership is now vested with the
Fisheries Co-operative Association
(FCA). But no licences were required
for simple technologies like hook and
line, seaweed and shell collection.
A third type of rights was also
given, but only to the affluent net
owners by the feudal authorities. This
was mainly species-specific. Whales,
tuna, and sardines could be caught
under this system of prescriptive
rights which was perhaps the most
rewarding source of revenue for the
authorities. These rights could be
sold, mortgaged or inherited.
Though the feudal authorities
tried to divide fishing rights between
affluent net owners and small
fishermen, the territorial rights system
had very little egalitarian content.
Within the village a fraction of
villagers monopolised the fishing
grounds in return for payment of
taxes. The establishment of a public
fund in 1762 (in Fukuoka) with the
idea of providing cheap credit to small
fishermen was mainly for strength-
ening their clout vis-à-vis the interests
of large owners. At the same time, the
licensing scheme was very strictly
imposed on the large gear operators
to discourage monopolisa-tion of
fisheries by a few owners (ibid.). In
other words, there were some efforts
on the part of the feudal authorities to
balance the power between different
gear-groups (but, significantly, not
between the rich and the poor). Since
there is no critical analysis of the
feudal strategies vis-à-vis allocation
of rights, we are unable to say
anything more about the priorities of
the authorities — whether it is due to
administrative reasons or financial
reasons or for securing corvee labour.
Though exclusive fishing ter-
ritories were established, there was
no indication on how borders should
be defined on land (regarding access
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to sandy beaches) and at sea (demar-
cating different fishing territories).
This, in addition to the privatisation of
fishing grounds and monopolisation
of gear, led to various disputes. These
disputes were either between
villages or between different gear-
groups. The former were largely over
boundaries, the rights to common
fishing, and licensing of large nets.
The latter were because of labour
shortage, gear destruction and
impact on shoal movement. 
Poaching was another inter-
village problem undertaken
probably with the intention of
acquiring prescriptive rights to
common fishing in the water of the
neighbouring villages. Concern was
also expressed regarding resource
depletion caused by larger gear.
Implicit in the above discussion
are three factors. Firstly, the develop-
ment of the market in Japan,
particularly its uniform development
across the country. Secondly, the
existence of rich resources and
thirdly, the existence of technology
and skill to capture and supply fish to
the market.
The post feudal period
In 1876, fiefs were abolished and
all fisheries reverted to the central
government. A new system of
operation was introduced under which
the individual fisherman had to pay a
use tax. But because of heavy
opposition from the fishermen this
system was replaced by fisheries co-
operatives in 1887 «to co-ordinate the
use of coastal fishing grounds»
(Ruddle, K. 1987).
The first national fisheries law
was enacted in 1901 and it was mainly
with the idea of maintaining peace
and order in the fishing villages (ibid.).
The law was based on traditional
practices without any effort to remove
the inequities during the feudal
period. The feudal rights were sup-
plemented and formally categorised
into those for capture fisheries,
beach-seines, set-nets and
mariculture. The fishing village guilds,
of which fishermen were members
during the feudal times, were made
the nucleus under the new law and
designated as Fisheries Associations
(FAs). Their functions were more or
less the same till 1910 viz. granting of
fisheries rights and the issuance of
licences within the territorial limits of
the villages. But in 1910 the law was
amended and FAs were permitted to
engage in economic activities, in-
cluding co-operative marketing.
However, the principal function
remained the former.
The 1901 Fisheries Law also did
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precious little to alleviate small-scale
fishermen from exploitation by
middlemen and fish wholesalers.
This situation was made worse by
motorization and gear modernization
which began in the 1920s, resulting
in efficient offshore vessels fishing in
coastal waters. The recession in the
1930s aggravated their distress even
further. The Meiji government
reorganised the FAs to improve their
condition. One Association per
village was established. The joint
fishing rights areas were extended
further offshore to protect them from
offshore fishermen. Attempts were
made to break the grip of the
middlemen by encouraging co-
operative marketing by the FAs.
According to Ruddle:
«from the late 1930s, with the great
decline in the number of middlemen,
wholesalers and moneylenders,
many of the residual elements of
feudalism were essentially eliminated
from Japanese fishing villages and
fish landing ports. Henceforth, the
fishermen themselves were the
masters of the coastal fishing
grounds and their communities…»
(ibid.)
However, Zengyoren (National
Federation of Fisheries Cooperative
Association) is of a different view. Ac-
cording to their ‘Fisheries 
Cooperatives in Japan’ (Zengyoren
nd.),
«During the pre-War years, many
fishing villages were dominated by
merchants, landlords, or absentee
net masters, who lent out their
fishing rights and lived off the
commission they received. In many
instances, such people were also
the controlling officers of the village
fishermen union (Fishermen
Association). The actual fishermen
merely rented land and house, and
borrowed operating expenses from
the people» (parenthesis added).
The truth must be somewhere
between the rosy picture painted by
Ruddle and the dismal picture by
Zengyoren. One is likely to agree
more with the latter view because
under Meiji law the concept of fisher-
man was not defined. Therefore, all
those who lived in the coastal village,
irrespective of whether he was an
absentee or actual fisherman, got
membership in the FAs. The
absentee fishermen in all likelihood
must have maneuvered the Associa-
tion to protect their interests that pri-
marily lay in fixed net fishery. Further-
more, as Comitini (1967) remarks:
«Even though the fishermen’s
association was the legal owner of the
fishing right, it could not itself engage in
fishing operations. Its importance lay
primarily in its control over the
fishermen. Thus, even though the
fishermen fished independently, they
were subject to regulation laid down by
the association. The section of the law
prohibiting the association from direct-
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ly operation the «the fishing rights
ensured that the large scale fixed-net
rights remained in the hands of the
«customary» users. These private
right fisheries, pre-empting the best
fishing grounds, were several times
more productive than  the common-
right fisheries» (Comitini 1967).»
The post war
administration of coastal
fisheries
In an attempt to «democratize»
the institutional structure of Japanese
coastal fishery and to promote fishery
productivity, a new fisheries law was
enacted in 1949 by the Central
Government with the assistance of
the SCAP (Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers) authority. The most
significant aspect of the new Law was
that it granted fishery rights and
licences only to fishermen or fishing
enterprises actually engaged in
fishing. It prohibited the transfer or
leasing of fishing rights. This Law
was complemented by the Fisheries
Cooperative Association Law of 1948
which had the objective of improving
the economic and social status of
fishermen and fish processors in ad-
dition to increasing fishery productivi-
ty. The main intention behind the
democratization process was to weed
out the last vestiges of feudalism. In-
stead of displacing the 1901 law with
a new one, what was attempted was
a strengthening of conventional
laws/customary practices by remov-
ing the non-democratic and ex-
ploitative content of the previous
Law. The customary management
principles were also formalised
under the new system.
The present management of
fisheries is in compliance with a dual
system of rights and licences
administered by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
according to the Fisheries Law of
1949. (see table 1) Most of the respon-
sibilities for administering coastal
waters are delegated to the
prefectures. Fishing rights in the
marine context refer to the coastal
waters and cover those fisheries
«that either employ fixed gear or that
exploit a relatively immovable
benthos» (Ruddle 87). All coastal
waters where fishing is permitted are
divided among FCAs. In contrast,
the licences govern those fisheries
that catch migratory or highly mobile
species and are issued for coastal,
offshore and distant water fishing.
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Table I
The Structure of Japanese Fishing Rights and Licences
Rights
Categories Granted to
(1) JOINT FISHERY RIGHTS
A. Gathering seaweed, shellfish and other benthos
B.  Specific to small-scale net fisheries Exclusively to FCA’s
C.  Beach seines, unmotorized trawling, fish shelters
(2) DEMARCATED FISHERY RIGHTS
A. Special Demarcated Rights Exclusively to FCA’s private
B. Demarcated Rights organizations and individuals
(3) LARGE-SCALE SET-NET FISHERY RIGHTS -do
Licences
(1) LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS IN Mostly to private
DISTANT WATERS Organizations and individuals
(2) MEDIUM-SCALE OPERATIONS IN DEEP WATERS -do-
(3) SMALL-SCALE NEARSHORE OPERATIONS FCA’s or individuals
(Source: Ruddle, K. 1987)
The fishery rights system protects
coastal fisheries and fishermen
against encroachments of other
fisheries and other economic sectors
by granting them property rights.
Joint rights are issued for the
coordinated use of a fishing area and
its resources by all members of an
FCA. The allocation of fishing territory
among the types of gear mentioned in
the table and the fishermen to be
engaged in their operation are
internally decided by an FCA (ibid.).
Demarcated Rights are granted
for aquaculture and are usually valid
for five years. The Special Demar-
cated Fishing Rights are granted
when many fishermen would want to
engage in aquaculture in a large area
of the sea. And Demarcated Fishing
Rights are granted for pond
aquaculture.
Rights for Large-Scale Set-Net
fisheries are largely species-specific
and are managed by the prefecture.
When joint rights embrace the entire
sea territory of an FCA, demarcated
rights and those for set-nets are
granted only for specific areas within
the joint rights area. All fishermen
belonging to a specific FCA are en-
titled to fish within its sea territory but
only a limited number of fishermen
are granted set-net and demarcated
rights. An FCA is granted demarcated
and set-net rights only if it has areas
suitable for them within its territory.
Thus the tentativeness of Meiji
fishing rights was removed and the
rights were neatly categorized for
capture and culture fisheries with
reference to the species caught and
the technology used. In other words,
the species caught, technology
used and the fishing ground became
clear determinants of fishing rights.
Therefore, there is no ambiguity
about its definition.
Fishing licences
Licences for small-scale
fisheries in coastal waters are
granted by the prefecture to individual
fishermen. They do not have the legal
status of property rights. « In prin-
ciple, licences are issued for fisheries
not covered by fishing rights and in
particular for migratory species taken
from trawlers larger than 15 GT and
purse-seiners over 40 GT». (ibid.) 
Prior fishing experience is a
precondition for applying for fisheries
rights. To be considered as a fisher-
man 90 to 120 days must be spend
actually fishing in the sea. It is also
important that they must have not
been found guilty of flagrant violations
of the Fisheries Law or labour
regulations and not in possession of
other fishery rights.
96
FISHING LEGISLATION IN ASIA
97
SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1
Table II
Administration of Japanese Fisheries
Organ Area of Function Composition
Jurisdiction
Central Fishery National level To deliberate 25 Commissioners
Adjustment Council Under the Min. Important
of Agriculture, matters relating 15-representatives
Forestry and to the enforcement of fishery operators
Fishing of 1949 law & fishery employees
10-persons of
learning and
experience
Fishery Adjustment Prefectural To carry on
Commission matters relating
To the fisheries.
a) Sea – Area Every Within the sphere 15 Commissioners
Fishery prefecture of the sea-area
Adjustment in which it is set up 9 - elected by
Commision fishermen.
4- fishing specialists
2- representing
public interests.
b) United Sea-Area 2 or more Need based
Fishery prefectures
Adjustment
Commission
Source: Ruddle, K. 1987.
Allocation problems in the rights
to large-scale set-net fisheries and in
demarcated fisheries are pre-empted
by granting top priority to the FCAs.
The management of coastal
fisheries through this dual system of
rights and licences is at three levels.
At the national level there is the
Central Fishery Adjustment Council
and at the prefectural level, the
Fishery Adjustment Commission.
There are two types of FACs.  One is
the Sea-Area Fishery Adjustment
Commission and the other, the United
Sea-Area Fishery Adjust-ment
Commission. The former — about 65
in number is formed in every
prefecture, whereas the latter is
established only when there is a need
for it, e.g., to control the fisheries of
seasonally migratory species which
would require the coordinated effort
of more than one prefecture.  (See
Table II).  And lastly, there is Fisheries
Co-operative Association, more than
3000 in number, established in every
fishing village and entrusted with the
duty of implementing the Law with the
participation of fishermen.
The FCA plays the most central
role in the management of coastal
waters.  Its principal functioning is
«planning, management and sustain-
ed development of the sea territory for
which the individual community has
tenure» (ibid.). The near-shore waters
are essentially self-managed by the
FCAs and they form the vital link
between individual fishermen and the
central and prefectural government.
The national and prefectural
agencies are established as per the
Fisheries Law of 1949 and the FCAs
as per the Fisheries Cooperative
Associations Law of 1948.  Thus, in
Japan the co-operative movement is
well integrated into the Fisheries Law
and because of this, the law has great
deal of legitimacy, unlike most of the
fishing nations in the Asian region.
The efficacy of Japanese
fisheries management is essentially
because of its organisational struc-
ture which facilitates a proper integra-
tion of national management principles
with the local customary practices. In
other words, there is no «kink» in the
legislation between the national and
local levels. In addition, the regula-
tions are flexible and contextually
applicable according to the discretion
of the FCAs because the responsi-
bility to interpret the Law according to
the specificities of the region is left to
the local FCA.  Thus, the room for
positive manoeuvrability enables the
viable functioning of a system in a
country of multiple fisheries.
The social basis of its organisa-
tional structure is the behavioural
norms of Japanese society where
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«harmony together with community
or group orientation still strongly
influence... social behaviour » (ibid.).
In other words, the relatively
successful implementation of
legislation and regulation through its
organizational structure is because of
specific value judgements of society
that inspire belief in legitimacy. This is
perhaps further linked with the spirit of
nationalism or a national ideology
which has given the State a great
deal of legitimacy.
What is most interesting about
the development of Japanese fishing
industry is that the Fishery Law of
1949 could successfully achieve the
twin goals of democratisation and
enhancement in production by
making these goals compatible with
each other.
Two aspects of the 1949 Law are
worth mentioning. Firstly, the Law
successfully demarcates the fishing
industry into coastal, offshore and
distant water fishery and successfully
prevents any conflicts between the
three. This does not mean that there
are no conflicts within these sectors.
But for resolution of intra-sectoral
conflicts there is no resort to judicial
machinery because the organiza-
tional structure is such that these
problems can be settled within the
industry through the FCA or SAACs.
Resort to the judicial machinery arises
largely in the context of inter sectoral
problems when there are issues of
pollution and reclamation affecting
the livelihood or the tenurial rights of
the coastal fishermen.
The demarcation of the fishing
industry into coastal, offshore and
distant water is mainly with the
objective of easing competition
between different class interests
(See Comitini op. cit.). According to
Oka (quoted in Comitini, op. cit.) the
implicit objectives of fishery control in
Japan is to leave the high
productivity fishing grounds (coastal
waters) to low efficiency  boats and
the low productivity (offshore
grounds) areas to high-efficiency
boats since low-efficiency boats
cannot exploit the off-shore grounds
successfully. Again the rationale for
management, according to Oka, is
not the maintenance of balance
between fishing effort and total yield
but on the other hand, «a counter
measure against a recession in the
fishery business caused by
fluctuations in the Japanese
economy» (ibid.).
Management of conflicts
One of the salient aspects of
conflicts in the fisheries sector of Japan
is that, the conflicts are not between
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coastal and offshore fisher-men. They
are primarily between two sectors of
the economy (i.e. between fisheries
and industry), localized, inter-
prefectural or intra-prefectural in
nature and within the coastal region.
As Ruddle points out, one of the
major sources of fisheries conflict in
Japan was the «differential rates at
which different communities adopted
new technologies» (Ruddle op. cit..
The major disputes have stemmed
from entry rights disputes, gear
conflicts, illegal fishing, bound-ary
jurisdictions, island ownership, etc.
With the advancement of the
economy the nature of conflicts also
have changed in Japan.
During the feudal time the
principal conflicts were over access to
sandy beaches (for the operation of
beach seines) and the demarcation of
the boundary at sea. Therefore, the
conflicts were either land or sea
based. During the Meiji period the
conflicts became largely technology-
based because of the introduction of
trawling and other efficient fishing
technologies like purse-seining. Thus,
for example, the conflicts between
trawler fishermen, traditional anglers
and longliners in the Essa strait
following the introduction of trawling
in 1919-21 period still continue.
With the rapid industrialization of
Japan during the post-War period
there was increasing pressure on
the coastal waters. A series of
govern-ment policies were
formulated to generate the flow of
labour to the industrial sector at the
expense of agriculture and fisheries
(lwakiri, S. 1979). The policy of rapid
indus-trialization and high economic
growth led to large scale reclamation
of coastal areas on the one hand
and pollution of inshore waters on
the other. According to the
Environment Agency, in 1973, 21.2
per cent (5650 km) of the total length
(26,539 km) of Japan’s coast-line
has been com-pletely reclaimed and
closed to the people (ibid.). This was
particularly severe in the Tokyo Bay
area and the Seto Inland sea. Thus,
as a result of new priorities the
conflicts graduated from intra-
sectoral to inter-sectoral in
character.
What is quite interesting to
observe in conflict management is
that intra-sectoral problems are
resolved with the assistance of
various agencies which have a
representational character and func-
tioning within the sector. Whereas,
inter-sectoral problems are largely
referred to the adjudication of the
court of law.  In other words, traditional
conflicts originating in the pre-War era
are resolved within the sector and
those which are a product of the post-
War period are referred to the courts.
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According to Ruddle, in inter-sectoral
conflicts traditional methods of resolu-
tion are generally not useful because
of clashing world-views of the parties
concerned resulting in the recourse to
judiciary to resolve disputes.
At the local level, customary
techniques are employed to avoid or
minimise interpersonal conflicts
which include avoidance behavior
(i.e. avoiding to fish at the favourite
spot when there are other fishermen
around, instead of fighting with them)
and the acknowledgement of the
rights of a first-corner to a particular
fishing spot (Ruddle, op. cit.).
Prevalence of certain voluntary
customary pratices do not preclude
the occurrence of conflicts within an
FCA. But unlike in many other
societies there are social forces that
balance and iron out disputes for the
betterment of the village as a whole.
According to Ruddle, consensus
decision-making is very central to the
functioning of FCAs. In other words,
the decision-making process is struc-
tured in such a manner that every in-
terest is represented/ reflected in the
decision taken.  We are not clear from
his discussion how exactly an FCA
takes care of hierarchy of power
within a village in this consensus ap-
proach.  Could it be that the important
pressure groups are able to elicit
desired response from less powerful
groups within the FCA through covert
means? At an informal level, inter-
mediary and peer pressures are also
used to resolve minor conflicts.  The
threat of social ostracization is the
ultimate penalty in unyielding cases
of conflicts, which facilitates
conformity to the collective will in
cases of outright theft or deliberate
damage to another person’s gear.
Formal resolution of
conflict
While intra-village problems are
informally resolved, inter-FCA, intra &
inter prefectural problems are
resolved at a formal level.  Such con-
flicts could include violation of closed
season, destructive fishing, poaching,
illegal sale of tainted fish and
problems arising from incompatibility
of technologies like, for example, the
conflicts between set-netters and gill-
netters.  These conflicts, if occurring
within a prefecture, are resolved by
the Sea Area Adjustment Commission
and if inter-prefectural, by the United
Sea Area Adjustment Commission.
However, such incidents are not
numerous in number, and according
to the Zengyoren, the number of such
violations are dwindling over time
(personal discussion with the Chief
Executive of Zengyoren).
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Resolution of inter-sectoral
problems
Inter-sectoral problems arise
mainly out of the conflicting interests
of industry and fisheries.  As we have
mentioned before, post-War Japan
focused mainly on industrialisation
and economic growth at the expense
of the agriculture and fisheries
sectors.  This led to problems for the
fishing communities particularly
problems created by pollution and
coastal reclamation. Until the end of
1960s these problems were
considered to be a price to be
collectively paid for economic
progress.  However, the desirability
of industrial growth at the expense of
citizen and community welfare and
rights was challenged in the 1970s in
the wake of «Big Four» pollution
incidents (Mina-mata disease or
mercury poisoning; Itai-itai disease or
cadmium poisoning and various
pulmonary disorders) (Ruddle op.
cit.).
In the post-War period, inter-
sectoral problems were mostly
resolved with the help of the judicial
machinery. The judiciary got involved
mainly due to the refusal of the
companies to own responsibility for
damages done to life by pollution and
due to the attitude of the government
which often sided with the polluter.
Thus the judiciary originally got
involved on humanitarian grounds
though later it also took up cases of
inadequate compensation for the
relinquishment of fisheries rights.
According to Ruddle there are
three reasons for the use of judiciary
by the fishermen.
Firstly, traditional processes of
mediation were not trusted to render
a just solution because of their
abuse by polluting companies.
Secondly, the growing realisation
that the situation had become
completely atypical and divorced
from traditional precedents.  And
thirdly, the desire of fishermen to fix
accountability on the perpetrators of
destruction which was possible only
through the judicial process.
The judicial process had an
added legitimacy because of the
widespread sympathy for fishermen
as a result of the «Big Four» tragedy.
The redress for pollution and
partial or total loss of fishing rights
due to reclamation was mainly in the
form of compensation.  Thus, as
Ruddly remarks,
«reinforcement of that traditional
right to compensation may perhaps
have been the most important
achievement of the post-war
campaign against pollution»
(op.cit.).
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However, the distribution of
compensation is very poor (ibid.)
and according to Prof. Hirasawa
there are malpractices in its
distribution (personal discussion).
The current problems of
Japanese coastal fishery 
With rapid economic growth, im-
provement in welfare, and excellent
opportunities for mobility of labour,
fishermen in present day Japan, are
increasingly becoming disinterested
in fishing as an occupation.  As a
result, more and more FCAs are
willing or wanting to sell their fishing
rights for phenomenal compensation.
Reliance on compen-satory payments
has become a way of life for many
local fishing communities. The
amount paid as compensation partly
finds its way back to the fishing sec-
tor and partly gets invested in real
estate and small industrial enter-
prises. The reinvest-ment in the fishing
sector has made it more capital-
intensive (as somebody jokingly
remarked, the modern Japanese
fishing boat is like a battle ship!) im-
plying an enhancement of productive
capacity in fishing grounds already
rendered fragile by degrada-tion and
habitat destruction. (1)
In spite of a reasonably efficient
management system, Japanese
coastal fisheries are not free from
problems.  Two main problems still
faced by the coastal fisheries are:
(i) decline of resources because of
overfishing and the reduction of
fishing grounds due to coastal
land reclamation projects and
marine pollution and
(ii) ageing of the fishery work force
and the disinterest of youngsters
to join fisheries (Zengyoren op.
cit.).
Overfishing in the coastal waters
is mainly because of mechanized
gear, efficient fishing techniques and
motorized vessels, combined with
fishermen’s «strong natural tendency
to overfish» (ibid.).  This has also led
to over-capitalisation of the fisheries
sector (lwakiri op. cit.)
According to the Seventh Fishery
Census of Japan (1983), about 60
percent of the individually owned
SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1
(1) However, Matsuda and Kaneda (1984) are of the view that the money is not invested in fisheries development.
They observe:
«As the economic functions of Fisheries Co-operative Association (FCAs) increased so their administrative function
began to be misused i.e., they took advantage of their administrative function only for the members’ short-term
economic welfare, but neglected both social welfare as well as long-term economic welfare».
fishery management units are headed
by men over 50, 25 percent by men
over  50, 25 percent by men over 60,
and only 15 percent are controlled by
men under 40. This is complemented
by a shortage for brides in the coastal
villages (arising from women
migrating to urban centres and
marrying from other com-munities).
Many people expressed the fear that,
over time, the coastal fishing sector
will become less and less important.
In addition to over-fishing and over-
capitalisation Matsuda and Kaneda
(op. cit.) also point out that,
«the productivity of common 
fishery rights areas has not
increased since 1952, regardless of
high subsidies for coastal fisheries
development, which have included
nationwide ocean ranching
programs and artificial reef
projects» (ibid.)
The indifference or lack of
interest of youngsters towards fishing
as an occupation is further reflected
in the activities of fisheries co-
operatives. Members increasingly
show no initiative to participate fully in
the functioning of their FCA.  The
relationship between the co-operative
and the memebers is degenerating in
some places into a simple customer-
supplier relationship (Zengyoren op.
cit.).  If the tendency continues,
Zengyoren fears that,
«the fisheries Co-operative will be in
danger of becoming bureaucratised
and having its democratic nature
reduced to a mere formality» (ibid.)
Since the co-operatives are
getting excessively involved in the
abandonment of fishery rights for
compensation, the fishermen have
also gradually lost public support
(Matsuda and Kaneda op. cit.)
Because of this, and the inability of
FCAs to accommodate recreational
fisheries under the existing legal
framework, Matsuda and Kaneda
foresee a limited future for the FCAs.
There are about 10-20 million
recreational fishermen who have
already begun to claim their rights in
the common fishery rights areas.  In
addition, the general public is
claiming rights to the beach.  In the
light of these new developments,
combined with the inertia of the
FCAs, it will be interesting to watch
the coastal fisheries of Japan in
future.
Conclusion 
In spite of problems of over-
capitalisation, overfishing, and other
recent developments the success of
coastal fisheries management in
Japan is umatched anywhere else in
the world.  What are the factors that
facilitated this success?
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Japan is a classic case where
many positive factors coexisted and
complemented one another thereby
facilitating the efficacy of the system.
These factors are not confined only to
the fisheries sector — they are vitally
inter-sectoral in character.  Japan,
again, shows that the successful
management of the fisheries sector
becomes a concrete reality only when
there is overall development of the
economy.  In other words, problems
within the sector cannot be solved in
isolation but only in conjunction with
other sectors.
Historically speaking, granting
of tenurial rights to fishermen in the
sea, right from the Tokugawa period
onwards provided a proper basis for
the future development of coastal
management.  Our discussions
show that these rights form the hub
of the management system.  This
system is unique to Japan.
In a country where fish is the
main source of protein, even in the
olden days, development of markets
for marine products took place rather
early.  Since the entire population is
fish-eating, the size of the market was
as incentive for enhanced production.
This was further complemented by
the settlement pattern of the popula-
tion. The archipelagic nature of the
country coupled with forested, moun-
tainous hinterland resulted in the con-
centration of population in the coastal
areas.  Further there was no taboo
attached to fish-eating (unlike the
Balinese in Indonesia, for example,
who were averse to eating fish
because they considered the sea as
a repository of filth!)  (See Polunin
1984).
By inference, we can see that
the required skill and technology were
locally available.  The sea was also
very rich in resources.  Availability of
resources, skill and technology and
tenurial rights in conjunction with an
absorptive market provided a broader
base for the development of the
fisheries sector.
The successful democratization
of the fishing sector, strengthening of
the co-operative movement and the
classification of the fishery into
coastal, offshore and distant water,
resulted in the betterment of
fishermen.  While improvement in the
welfare of coastal fishermen was
achieved by reserving the coastal
waters through joint and demarcated
rights, the objective of enhanced
production was achieved by the
successful seaward expansion of
fishing fleets into the offshore and
distant water areas.  In other words, a
neat division of fishing space between
the small-scale and large-scale sector
could be a reason for the success of
the management system.
SAMUDRA MONOGRAPH No 1
In this context, it is important to
remember that big capital in Japan
was able to successfully diversify in-to
new areas and into new forms of
technology.  The investors were able
to diversify the technology base to
meet the national objective of higher
production. Thus even when there
were conflicts within the coastal
waters, these were confined to the
designated fishery. Of course, the
technology-induced offshore and deep
sea fishing ventures were supported
by a rapidly growing economy which
paid the highest per unit value for fish
in the world.  Therefore, the massive
investment in these frontiers were not
at the mercy of the vagaries of the
world market, but, on the other hand,
were adequately compensated by the
national economy.
Even after the declaration of EEZ
and the oil price rise in the 1970s
which adversely affected Japanese
distant water operations, the rapid
growth achieved by the Japanese
economy enabled the importation of
fish products to meet domestic
requirements. Concomitantly, culture-
fishery was further strengthened in the
coastal waters.  In other words, the
difficulties within the sector could be
neutralised to a great extent by certain
macro-developments in the economy
as a whole.
Demographic factors also alle-
viated any increase in pressure on
the limited fishing space within the
joint rights jurisdiction.  On the other
extreme, there is a potential threat
that the coastal fishery may have to
wind up !  The total number of
fishermen in Japan has come down
from around 700,000 in the mid
1940s (source:  Hirasawa, I. personal
discussion) to around 200,000 in
1983 (The Seventh Fishery Census
of Japan 1983) and it is dominated by
fisherman in the age group 50-60.
This gives credence to the hypothesis
that, given a choice, a fisherman has
a tendency to decide against fishing.
In other words, among the primary
producing sectors, fisheries is
perhaps the last resort in a situation
of unlimited supply of labour. When
there are opportunities for inter-
sectoral mobility there is an outward
migration from the primary producing
sectors, particularly from the fishing
sector.
The «objective» factors we have
mentioned above have definitely
played a positive role in the reproduc-
tion of customary ethos without much
dilution.  The balancing of economic,
social and political forces was such
that it enabled the strengthening of
the ‘consent’ content within the social
fabric of relationships in favour of cer-
tain norms already established in the
marine context. In other words, the
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legitimacy of law has a certain strong
economic basis and if this basis was
weaker there would have been
tremendous refraction between
legislation, on the one hand, and its
acceptance and enforceability on the
other.
But at the same time, because of
the changing economic environment
in Japan, there are rapid changes in
the fisheries sector too. The dwindling
fishermen’s population and the grow-
ing involvement of FCAs in for-saking
fishing rights for compensation are
portentous indicators to the future of
the present framework of fisheries
management.  This is further
complicated by the pressures exerted
by recreational fishermen for fishing
rights and the general public for rights
to the beach.
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Conflicts in the coastal waters 
The attention that conflicts
between trawlers and traditional
gear-groups has received in Asia
tends to give an impression that
emergence of tensions within the
fisheries sector is a result of the
introduction of trawling.  However,
historically there have been many
kinds of tensions even between the
traditional gear-groups.  Thus, for
example, access to sandy beach for
the operation of beach-seine was an
important form of conflict in Japan in
the feudal period.  In Sri Lanka there
were conflicts between the local
fishermen (using coir-made beach-
seine) and the migrant fishermen
from India (using cotton beach-seine)
as far as back as in the 1860s.
Similarly, in certain parts of Thailand,
conflicts between gill-nets and crab-
nets and squid-trap and crab-nets
are common within the traditional
sector even today.
Such tensions have been either
land-based (over access to the
beach) or sea-based.  The latter could
be territorial disputes in areas where
there are tenurial rights to the coastal
waters or they could be disputes over
overlapping resource-space. Other
factors have also contri-buted towards
tension in coastal waters: mud
discharge following deforestation,
dumping of tailings after mining (e.g.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines),
industrial pollution, coastal reclama-
tion, conversion of mangroves into
aquaculture-ponds, etc.
Of course, introduction of
technology vastly more efficient than
what is in use gives the tensions a
certain edge. This is so with the
introduction of trawling, developed in
response to interna-tional demand for
prawns, which builds up to a classic
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case of clash between incompatible
technologies.
Often, the destruction of fishing
gear and the falling share in the total
production of the non-trawl fishermen
are instrumental in the build-up of
tension. This is further worsened by
allegations of resource depletion and
inequity from differences in efficiency.
Even here, tensions do not
always lead to open conflicts. The
experience of Southeast Asian
countries shows that a unique
combination of factors —- often
specific to each country/society —
influences the open manifestation of
these tensions in the form of conflicts.
Thus, in Indonesia and Malaysia, the
ethnic factor in combination with
destruction of gear and decline in the
share of total catch of gill-net
fishermen was responsible for the
violent eruptions.  In Thailand,
however, the eruption of conflicts was
relatively benign because of the
dimunitive size of the traditional
sector. Similarly, in certain pockets of
the Philippines and Thailand there is
no apparent incompatibility between
trawlers and traditional gear-groups
when they operate from the same
locality.  But there is tension if the
trawlers come from outside.
The eruption of tension into
conflicts also seems to be determined
by other social factors. In villages mark-
ed by a strong patron-client
relationship between the local
fisherman and the village trader (e.g.
Suki relationship in the Philppines),
there seems to be fewer eruptions of
conflicts if the trader is also a trawler-
owner.  Alternatively, if the fisherman
belongs to a community, traditionally
known for its militancy (the Buginese
community in Indonesia, for example),
the occurrence of conflicts are more
frequent, often marked by violence.
How the degree of militancy decides
the nature of conflicts also seems to
be influenced by the nature of
involvement in fishing —- whether the
fisherman is a full-time fisherman or
one who combines fishing with
farming operations.  In the latter case,
he seems to be less inclined to, or
involved in, articulating protest.
Conversely, in Indonesia  and
Malaysia — where the most intense
conflicts broke out — the fishermen
actively involved in open fights were
mostly full-time fishermen.  Thus,
cultural factors and the extent of
involvement in fishing can either
subsume conflicts between incom-
patible technologies or exacerbate
them in different societies.
The role of legislation in
conflict management
The response of the State to these
conflicts —- primarily between trawling
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and traditional gear —- is through
enactment of legislation. This gesture is
more common when there is intense
articulation of protest against trawling
(e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia).  Where
the expression of protest is diffused and
feeble, either the State does not step in
(e.g. Thailand) or it intervenes in such a
manner that the legislation, at best,
remains an exercise in rhetoric (e.g. the
Philippines).
But legislation in fisheries has
not been restricted to conflict
management. Historically, it aimed 
at conservation of resources.
Particularly in the Southeast Asian
countries, non-quantitative regula-
tions like mesh restrictions, area/
seasonal closure and proscription of
dynamiting/cyanide-fishing were in
force, either in isolation or in
combination, from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. (1).
At present, with the exception of
Thailand, all countries in this region
claim that the twin-objectives of
legislation are management of
conflicts and resources. The principal
method for the attainment of these
objectives is the zoning arrangement,
which grants exclusive use-rights to
traditional gear-groups in the inshore
waters.
Efficacy of legislation
However, the legislative process
has never been comprehensive
enough to make provisions that are
truly efficacious.  This is largely due
to the absence of discussions with
conflicting gear-groups at the
formulation state and the lack of an
attempt to disseminate the content of
various provisions after enactment of
the law.  Whatever could be achieved
by these laws is further limited by the
confusion of the judiciary regarding
their interpretation. This seems to
arise from an inability to understand
the specificities of the marine context
(which are different from the agrarian
scene), particularly it three-
dimensional nature.
In any case, zoning is incapable
of achieving intended goals if  three
is a preponderance of commercial
species of prawns in the shallow
waters ( trawling is used  in  tropical
waters mainly for catching  prawns
and is the most efficient method of
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(1)  An interesting difference between the West and the East is that, in the Northern Atlantic area, e.g., the main focus of
early fisheries policies were the protection of fishermen’s  rights/interests and the maintenance of their fishing
opportunities everywhere rather than the protection of fish (see Derham, P.J. 1987).  However, in the Asian waters,
earliest regulations were concerned with the conservation of resources (Japan excluded) — Thailand, e.g., had accepted
principles of conservation from the nineteenth century onwards (Smith,op. cit.) - and not the protection of the fishermen.
harvesting them).  In such instances,
the temptation to violate laws is too
great even at the risk of apprehension
by the enforcement authorities.  But
legislation will be effective if the
proscribed waters are so overfished
that there is no worthwhile incentive
to violate the zone.  But in this case,
the legislation, would have come too
late to serve any real purpose.
Thus, considering the ineffec-
tiveness of zoning, Indonesia has
perhaps the best method for resolving
the conflicts, viz., a total ban on
trawlers in the waters dominated by
gill-net groups.  But there too exist
stories of covert violations by trawlers
under the aegis of corrupt army
officials. And to what extent this
decision is fishery-related is open to
question.  One should also note that
the Indonesian experience since
1980 suggests that a ban on trawling
by itself does not solve the problems
of operators of traditional gear.
Is effective promotion of equitable
exploitation of resources possible
through legislation at all? Since the
State represents a powerful coalition of
interests which are «allied» with users
of the more modern technology,
legislation becomes more a form of
conflict management aiming at
peaceful balance of interests, as we
have cited in the case of Malaysia,
rather than a resolution per se.  It may
tantamount to only rhetoric to establish
the State’s apparent  «sympathy» for
the protestors.
Legislation is Janus-faced and
seems to serve a dual purpose.
What Aubert observed (1973) in the
context of inadequate enforcement
of the Law of Housemaids in Norway
in 1948 is quite relevant to the intra-
sectoral conflicts in fisheries too:
«The law appears to yield to the
demands from one side in the
substantive clauses, while the other
side is fairly well protected by the
lack of effective enforcement. The
law thus serves a symbolic function
and ameliorates group conflicts»
(Aubert, V. 1973)
The ‘symbolic function’ of law as
elucidated by Aubert is the purpose
served by legislation in the fisheries
context too.  The appearance ‘to
yield to the demands from one side’
also has the subtle function to de-
escalate conflicts into a manageable
form. Concurrently, it also tries to
prevent the escalation into totally
undesirable realms. Thus, for
example, in Malaysia and Indonesia,
the government would not want the
graduation of inter-gear conflicts into
full-fledged ethnic-violence.
But at the same time, if the con-
flicts have already acquired certain
threatening dimensions (this depends
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on the perception of the State), the
State does not hesitate to resort to
radical measures (like the total ban in
Indonesia).  In such instances, the
role of law rises above its ‘symbolic
function’.  But then the decision is
less fishery-related; it is more in
response to the glaring ethnic
dimensions of the conflict rather than
to the need to develop the traditional
sector and to prevent overfishing.
The question of legitimacy 
Even if legislation had been
enacted, the legitimacy of regulations
is very central in determining its suc-
cess.  In most cases this is absent,
whether in the case of zoning viola-
tions (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand) or in
the case of destructive fishing. As
Jentoft and Kristoffersen observe in
their study on Lofoten Islands,
Norway:
«Regulations which the fishermen
themselves consider illegitimate
will be ineffective because, they
will tend to be resisted and by-
passed by the fishermen.
Legitimacy is not just a result of
the management decision itself,
for instance, its distributive effects
but also how it is reached».
(Jentoft, S. and Kristoffersen,
T. 1988-89)
As they rightly point out, the
most important question is how
legitimacy is arrived at.  This depends
so much on an understanding of
different world-views and the
realisation of the necessity to evolve
codes of conduct that minimise costs
to respective user-groups.  But as we
have mentioned before, in the
absence of ex ante discussions or
any attempt at disseminating the
content of legislation, different gear-
groups see legislation primarily as a
transgression into their legitimate
rights.  Though legally they are in the
wrong, morally they feel they are in
the right vis-a-vis the violations. A
classic example is the case of
destructive fishing practices using
dynamite and cyanide in the
Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand.
In these countries, perhaps in many
others too, dynamiting and use of
cyanide become destructive in their
eyes only because of the
intermediation of an outside
perception — in this instance, the
State’s. Otherwise, these practices
have local sanction.
Reasons for poor enforcement
Lack of legitimacy is also an
important reason contributing towards
the ineffective enforcement of
regulations. As Derham observes:
«They are often vociferous exponents
and demanding of enforcement,
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provided of course it is directed
elsewhere, and it is not unknown for
fishermen to claim a «legitimate
expectancy» of non-enforcement as
a defense in this situation».
(Derham, P.J. op. cit.)
Thus, for example, restrictions
on trawling are found unjust by its
operators but supported by non-trawl
fishermen.  At the same time those
who use fine mesh-nets and indulge
in destructive fishing among the
tradi-tional gear-groups do not agree
with the restrictions on these
methods.
Corruption among enforcement
officials and political interference
also contribute towards poor
enforcement in addition to other
difficulties we have mentioned in the
respective country reports.
The lack of legitimacy and the
general inertness of enforcement are
further compounded by the apathy of
the judiciary. The disposition of the
courts is to vindicate persons
charged with the violation of fishing
regulation s because of the difficulty
in clearly establishing the case.  As
Derham observes:
«There appears to be no immutable
definition of «fishing» and prosecution
cases have been lost because the
prosecuting authority failed to
convince the court that fishing per se
had taken place even though the
defendant vessel had her gear in the
water and was towing it.»
(Derham, P.J. op. cit.)
The violators of fishing regula-
tions seem to be aware of the
disposition of the court and,
therefore, the regulations cannot
even function as a deterrent.
Contrarily, the deterrent influence
seems to be replaced by an incentive
(Scwartz, R and Orleans, S. 1973).
Considering the poor legitimacy
of fisheries regulations, an efficacious
implementation of these regulations
is only  possible through enhance-
ment of the fear of apprehension and
punishment.  This would presuppose
the beefing-up of the enforcement
machinery.  Considering the three-
dimensional nature of the sea, the
fluidity of the medium, the mobility of
species, etc., an adequate enforce-
ment machinery would mean phe-
nomenal investment in men and
material which few countries can
afford. This situation is further compli-
cated by the question of political will
in the respective countries.
An alternative approach to
conflict management
In the absence of concern for
equity, the State is unlikely to ensure
distributional justice.  In such a
predicament what is the way out?
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Japan seems to offer a solution.  Its
fisheries management is structured
in such a manner that intra-sectoral
conflicts can be mediated within the
sector.  According to Ruddle:
«In the Japanese case, at all levels,
they involve much face-to-face
contact and prolonged discussion,
and they appear to be governed less
by the rule of the inflexible law to
which most westerners are
accustomed».
(Ruddle, K op. cit.)
In other words, there does not
seem to be any insularity between
different gear-groups and there
seems to be enough room for
dialogue. (Sri Lanka is another
country where inter-gear conflicts are
resolved through dialogue.  (1) But
the difference between Japan and Sri
Lanka is that, in the latter it is the
State that facilitates the dialogue as a
last resort).  Complementing this, is
the nature of the Japanese fisheries
laws (1901 and 1949) which are
essentially a codification of local
customs (Kada, Y. 1984) and,
therefore, the fisheries law is kind of
a «legitimation logic on a large formal
level» (ibid.).  This is the central
difference between Japanese
fisheries law and that of other
Southeast Asian countries).(2)
Further its final interpretation rests
with the village-level co-operatives
and not with the State.
As Ruddle points out, the viability
of any formal corpus of legislation
depends on the behavioural norms of
each society.  Law as legitimation logic
is possible in Japan mainly because of
the uniqueness of Japanese society.
(3) The consensual decision making
and obedience to law evolved over
centuries. So too, integration of values
and a certain degree of homogeneity.
Cultural traits vary from region
to region and country to country.
Thus, the case of Southeast Asia is
in sharp contrast to that of Japan.
There are sharp differences within
each country particularly along
communal or ethnic lines.  The
content of legislation exhibits certain
ad- hocism and is more or less
administrative in origin, thus
contributing to its poor legitimacy.
Still, it may be worthwhile to
organise the fishermen on the basis
of different gear and to facilitate face-
to-face dialogue for resolving (or
avoiding) conflicts. As Matsuda and
Kaneda observe:
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(1) Personal communication with Dr. Christy.
(2) And, therefore, the connotation of ‘law’ itself is different in Japan vis- a- vis other countries in our study.
(3) According to Noda, Y (1976), the aim of law in the Far East is to prevent disputes, unlike the Roman law, the
forbearer of all Western law which tries to resolve disputes.  He quotes Confucius: « If I judge a dispute I cannot do
other than what others do, but what I sincerely want is to do my best to see that there is no dispute».
«Illegal conduct can be reduced when
an agreement between or among
interest groups results from thorough
discussion about and a complete
understanding of the issues.  Open
discussion is the key to success
because it provides an early warning
of conflicts or potential conflicts».
(Matsuda and Kaneda, 1984)
Perhaps the State can take the
initiative to bring different gear-
groups with conflicting technologies
and world-views to evolve a modus
vivendi.  However, care should be
taken to ensure that dominant
groups do not, subtly, force their
interests upon others in connivance
with the State machinery.  In such for
a aiming at a consensus to resolve
conflicts, emphasis should also be
placed on conservation of
resources.  An important  point to
remember here is that, in spite of
evolving a modus vivendi, the state
of marine resources in Japan is
fragile because of little emphasis on
conservation.  Attempts at controlling
fishing effort in Japan is mainly with
the idea of regulating supply to the
market, not necessarily for
preventing overfishing.  In fact this is
a major lacuna of Japanese fisheries
management.  Considering the
pressure of population on a
shrinking resource-base, emphasis
must be placed on conservation of
resources, particularly in countries
where such contingencies are
already felt.
However, a viable management
programme will not be easy as long
as the opportunities of employment
and income are limited.  Only overall
economic development will lessen
the pressure on fisheries.  This is
already happening in some
countries, e.g., Malaysia.
The state of conflicts in
Southeast Asia is very different now.
This is in spite of poor enforcement.
The incidence of conflicts has
subsided.  There are no incidents of
burning of boats or open fights
leading to lose of life in Malaysia or
Indonesia.  This amelioration results
from different causes in different
countries: in Indonesia, the ban; in
Malaysia, economic development
and the relocation programme of
fishermen; in the Philippines,
depletion of coastal related and
fishery-independent factors in the
de-escalation of conflicts in these
countries would make an interesting
and useful study.  In the final
analysis, the most meaningful
resolution of conflicts lies both within
and without the fishing sector.
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THE INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE
IN SUPPORT OF FISHWORKERS
The International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) is an international
network founded in India in 1986, with the objective of providing fishworkers (men,
women and children) with a platform to make their voice heard at the international
level so that the numerous problems they face both at land and at sea may be
taken into consideration by their governments and the international organisations.
In its search for cooperation and solidarity, the Collective joins hands with
fishworkers’ organisations and unions. Its characteristic feature lays in its close
cooperation between scientists and social workers on the one hand and fishworkers,
both from Southern as well as from Northern countries, on the other.
The goals of the Collective can be considered as providing the basis of four
longterm programs..
Montoring and research programs
This program will provide the basis for various development studies in close
collabration with scientists and workers of the fishing profession.
Training and exchange programs
This program will undertake the essential task of exchanging experiences and
culminated knowledge. This will include the sharing of findings on new and
appropriate technologies, learning from new organisational structures and
interaction between the scientiic community and workers, with the objective of
demarginalising artisanal fisheries.  the interaction is twofold: on the one hand the
exchange between fishworkers and scientists and on the other hand the
communication between fishworkers of various countries.
Action and campaigns
ICSF decided to support, at their request, fishworkers organisations facing troubles.
Communication
The collective has devised various means of communication: SAMUDRA Report
SAMUDRA Dossier, SAMUDRA Monograph (*); a collection of video tapes, etc...
(*) The word «samudra« signifies «ocean» in many Asian languages and thus evokes the
vastness of the problems that face the fishworkers
Fishermen village in Zummaraga island, The Philippines.
(photo François Bellec)

FISHING LEGISLATION
AND GEAR CONFLICTS 
IN ASIAN COUNTRIES
The International Collective in Support of Fish-work-
ers (ICSF) has an ongoing monitoring programme.This
programme consists of studies undertaken to enhance our
understanding of the status of the fishworkers, the dynam-
ics of external assistance to the fisheries management
schemes.
This study concentrates on the latter aspect. It
examines the history and politics of fisheries management
in five Asian countries. It attempts to show how the specif-
ic management measures came into being; what the tech-
no-ecological and socio-politica factors were that influ-
enced the conceptualisation and implementation of these
measures; and how these measures are perceived by the
fishworkers and the bearing it has on their livelihood.
The study was undertaken by Sebastian Mathew, a
young freelance fisheries researcher from Kerala State,
India, who is associated with the fishworkers’ organisa-
tions in India. His earlier studies include assessments
about the technological change in fishing and its impact on
fishworkers.
The opinions and views expressed in the study are
those of the author and do not represent the official posi-
tion of the ICSF on these issues.
SAMUDRA Dossier n° 1
